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MAKING GLOBALISM WORK FOR EMPLOYEES 
JEFFREY M. HIRSCH* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is perhaps a cliché to describe globalism as a monumental development 
in the world economy.  Yet, at least with regard to the workplace, the cliché 
holds true.  The ability of many businesses to produce goods and sell them 
virtually anywhere in the world has put enormous competitive pressure on 
employers.  This pressure, in turn, extends to workers, as they also face 
competition from nearly every corner of the world. 
The increase in global competition has pushed employers to search for 
ways to cut labor costs—a strategy made easier by the increased availability of 
lower-cost foreign labor.  Many workers, therefore, have seen their 
compensation and work conditions deteriorate or have simply lost their jobs 
altogether.  Moreover, workers’ ability to fight these changes and pressure 
employers for better conditions has been undermined by the same global 
competition that has led employers to cut labor costs.  Demands for better 
wages and other benefits are often ineffective, as employers know that they can 
eventually move their production elsewhere. 
The combination of employers’ increased need for lower labor costs and 
the decreased effectiveness of employee pressure aimed at improving 
workplace conditions has meant that for many of today’s workers, globalism 
has been a disaster.  Worker advocates have attempted to address the problems 
faced by these workers, but there are significant limits to what they can 
achieve.  Traditional collective action—usually in the form of trade 
unionism—has rapidly waned over the past few decades, and even where 
unions are still active, their influence is often a shadow of what it once was.  
Into this void have entered several other strategies intended to gain benefits for 
workers, although substantial success has thus far been lacking. 
The different forms of collective action that have arisen in the face of 
globalism reflect the problems currently faced by workers.  These strategies 
include cooperation and coordination among foreign employee groups, 
 
* Assoc. Prof., University of Tennessee College of Law.  B.A., 1988, University of Virginia; 
M.P.P., 1995, College of William & Mary; J.D., 1998, New York University.  I thank Alan Hyde 
and Alex Long for their helpful comments.  I also owe much thanks to Sibyl Marshall for her 
excellent research. 
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pressure on employers to adopt codes of conduct or other voluntary labor 
standards agreements, new types of employee groups that focus on the needs of 
workers in the global economy, and government action intended to protect 
workers affected by global competition.1  All of these strategies involve 
attempts to reach across borders in much the same way that business has.  
There have been some successes, but they are often isolated and have yet to 
stem the negative effects of globalism on workers.  Despite this discouraging 
situation, there remains some hope for workers, largely in the possibility that 
governments will begin to take worker rights seriously.  Government pressure, 
in addition to resourceful uses of the other strategies, could provide real 
benefits for workers.  That outcome is far from certain, or even likely, but it 
remains one of the few hopes for workers as long as globalism’s competitive 
pressures still exist. 
Part I of this article discusses globalism’s effect on workers and their 
ability to pressure employers for better working conditions.  Part II explores 
various collective action strategies and their effectiveness in the global 
economy.  Finally, Part III argues that the main hope for workers is a 
multifaceted approach to collective action, combined with governments’ 
providing domestic legal protections for such action and pressuring other 
countries to support basic labor standards.  These strategies would not be 
guaranteed to succeed, yet without them, workers would almost certainly 
continue to suffer under globalism. 
I.  THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR LABOR AND ITS EFFECT ON WORKERS 
A. The Global Economy 
It is difficult to overstate the impact that globalism has had on the world 
economy, including demand for and supply of labor.  Although globalism has 
not fully reached all countries and industries, where it has taken hold, it has 
had a transformative effect.  The changes accompanying globalism have 
produced many gains, such as increasing the availability of goods and making 
those goods much cheaper.  Not all effects of globalism are positive, however.  
For many workers, globalism has produced far more costs than benefits. 
Much of globalism’s rise can be attributed to technological advances that 
have made communication and transportation far more effective and 
inexpensive.2  The increased ability of companies to transmit information 
 
 1. The terms “employee” and “worker” will be used interchangeably, although they can 
have significant differences under the law.  See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 2. Bruno Caruso, Changes in the Workplace and the Dialogue of Labor Scholars in the 
“Global Village,” 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 501, 520–21 (2007) (citing RICHARD SENNET, 
CULTURE OF THE NEW CAPITALISM (2006)); Katherine V.W. Stone, A New Labor Law for a New 
World of Work: The Case for a Comparative-Transnational Approach, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & 
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instantly and to ship goods easily across most of the world has made the idea 
of a local competitive market quaint.  For companies that do not face 
significant geographic limitations, the world is their competitive market.  They 
must compete against businesses from numerous countries, all of which can 
supply their goods to the same markets.  In turn, businesses can expand their 
own chains of production.  Whether by contracting work to foreign producers 
or simply hiring workers in other countries, many businesses have become 
truly global in scale.3 
The expansion of business opportunities around the world has meant that 
workers face a global market as well.4  Competition for jobs is no longer 
limited by geography, especially in the long run.  As long as businesses can 
expand or subcontract operations to different countries, workers from those 
countries will be competing against each other for jobs.  The result is a 
dramatic growth in the global supply of labor.5  One example of this effect is 
the dramatic increase in outsourcing—that is, the shift of jobs from one, 
generally high-wage country to another generally low-wage country—which 
has resulted in the transfer of millions of jobs.6 
This increase in labor supply has had a negative effect on workers, as it has 
placed downward pressure on wages and made workers’ attempts to obtain 
better work conditions more difficult.7  The rise in labor supply occurred in 
 
POL’Y J. 565, 571 (2007) [hereinafter Stone, A New Labor Law]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO-04-845SP, WORKFORCE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY:  CHANGING LABOR FORCE DYNAMICS AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES 6 
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04845sp.pdf. 
 3. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of Collective Representation: The Future of 
Collective Bargaining, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 903, 913 (2007); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, 
WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 289 (2004) 
(describing how globalism has helped to change the employment relationship). 
 4. See Stone, A New Labor Law, supra note 2, at 571 (describing globalism’s impact on the 
workplace). 
 5. One estimate is that the world labor supply nearly doubled in the 1990s due to the rise of 
globalism.  See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 914 (noting rise to 6 billion workers from 3.3 
billion). 
 6. See George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 955, 957–58 (2007) (estimating that 4.1 million service jobs will have moved from 
developed economies to developing economies by the end of 2008). 
 7. See infra Part I.C; George S. Roukis, Global Labor’s Uncertain Future, 30 J. 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 271, 274 (2005) (listing countries in which union density has 
declined as a result of globalization); Brian Burgoon & Wade Jacoby, Patchwork Solidarity: 
Describing and Explaining US and European Labour Internationalism, 11 REV. INT’L POL. 
ECON. 849, 855–64, 867 (2004) (describing types and extent of United States and European 
transnational unionism); Andreas Breitenfellner, Global Unionism: A Potential Player, 136 INT’L 
LAB. REV. 531, 533–35 (1997) (describing the tradeoff between unemployment and reduced 
wages). 
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countries with relatively little capital, like India and China, which has further 
suppressed wages and exacerbated the effect of the increase in labor supply.8 
The increased supply of low-cost labor has also made employee collective 
action more difficult.  As businesses find it easier to hire workers, those 
workers in turn lose some of their ability to pressure employers for better 
compensation.  One illustration of this problem is the increased challenges for 
formal unions in the global economy, as reflected by the worldwide decline in 
union membership.9  And although not the sole factor, globalism has been a 
significant contributor to this trend.10  Among the sharpest drops in union 
density is in the United States, where private sector union membership 
declined from 21.7% in 1977 to 7.2% in 2009.11  And although often not as 
severe as in United States, major economies throughout the world have also 
seen falling union density over the past couple of decades.  Indeed, the decline 
in France’s union density almost exactly mirrors that of the United States, 
falling from 21.3% in 1977 to 7.8% in 2007.12  Countries with much higher 
union densities have seen similar declines over the same time period, such as 
Germany, where union membership fell from 35.2% to 19.9%; the United 
Kingdom, which fell from 51.1% to 28%; and Canada to a lesser extent, which 
decreased from 35.1% to 29.4%.13 
 
 8. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 914–15.  The increase in supply of labor without a similar 
increase in supply of capital lowers the global economy’s capital-to-labor ratio, which in turn 
makes wages decrease.  Id.  In other words, if the amount of capital is low relative to the amount 
of labor, this means that there is not enough capital to use all the available labor, causing a 
surplus of labor and a decrease in wages. 
 9. Roukis, supra note 7, at 274 (listing countries in which union density has declined as a 
result of globalization). 
 10. Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 13 (1993). 
 11. This union “density” statistic represents the percentage of all private wage and salaried 
workers who are members of a union.  See BARRY T. HIRSCH & DAVID A. MACPHERSON, UNION 
MEMBERSHIP, COVERAGE, DENSITY, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS, 
1973–2009 (2010), http://unionstats.gsu.edu.  Public-sector union density rose from 32.8% in 
1977 to 37.4% in 2009.  Id.; see also Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union 
Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey, 56 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 349, 349–51 (2003) (describing method used to compile union membership data). 
 12. Exact comparison between transnational union densities is difficult because of 
differences in the way the data is computed; but virtually all countries saw significant declines in 
union coverage over the past few decades.  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., 
TRADE UNION DENSITY IN OECD COUNTRIES 1960–2007, available at http://www.oe 
cd.org/dataoecd/25/42/39891561.xls.  The United States union density in 2007 was 7.5%.  See 
Hirsch & Macpherson, supra note 11. 
 13. Hirsch & Macpherson, supra note 11. 
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Globalism, therefore, has been a troublesome issue for workers.14  It has 
generally suppressed their wages and compensation, while also hindering their 
ability to pressure for improvements in the workplace.  Workers and advocacy 
groups acting on their behalf have begun to seek ways to work together against 
these challenges.  Yet, their efforts thus far have not been widely successful.  
Even the accomplishments that do exist are often isolated events and are 
dwarfed by the experiences of other workers who have fared much worse 
under globalism.15 
There is no quick answer to this dilemma.  Workers can improve the way 
they engage in collective action, becoming more flexible and more willing to 
act on numerous fronts.  But truly significant, long-term improvements in the 
workplace—especially for the poorest workers—cannot be achieved through 
employee collective action alone.  Government pressure on workers’ behalf, 
whether through modifications to domestic law or the implementation and 
enforcement of global labor standards, is needed to provide real change.  
Whether countries will begin to exert real pressure on behalf of workers 
remains an open question.  But an examination of the global labor market and 
workers’ available strategies to combat its effects demonstrates the need for 
government action on workers’ behalf.16 
B. The Economics of Employee Collective Action 
The increasingly global labor market is an extreme example of the conflict 
between workers’ desires and the competitive pressures faced by employers.  
This conflict has long been an underlying theme in labor economics, which has 
struggled to explain how unions and other employee groups can extract 
benefits from employers facing competition from firms without such pressure.  
Globalism makes this tension between the needs of workers and employers 
more severe.17 
 
 14. See Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin 
Aaron Lecture, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 273–74, 278–85 (2001) (giving overview of 
globalism and its effect on labor law); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global 
Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 987, 990–
97 (1995) (discussing globalism’s effects on labor movements, including decreasing unions’ 
bargaining power, race-to-the-bottom wages, organizational fragmentation, and decreasing 
unions’ political clout). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part II.D. 
 17. For a more thorough discussion of the economics of employee collective action in the 
global economy, see Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee Collective Action in a Global Economy, in 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 606, 613 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2009).  Also, some of the collective action strategies the author discusses in this chapter 
will be explored in Part II of this Article.  See id. at 614–25. 
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The goal of unions and other employee groups is to improve work 
conditions.  This can mean different things, but generally involves seeking 
better wages and other forms of compensation, improved work conditions and 
safety, and increased voice in the workplace.18  With the possible exception of 
increased voice, these goals usually conflict with employers’ economic 
performance—at least under a traditional, neoclassical economic view of the 
firm. 
The conflict arises from the idea that the employer and workers are playing 
“a zero-sum game.”19  That is, extra expenditures that go to workers are taken 
away from other firm expenditures.20  In a perfectly competitive economy—
where entry and exit is easy and no firm is big enough to set wage levels—this 
additional expenditure is crucial.  A firm that has to spend more on its workers 
will be less profitable than other firms and will ultimately be forced out of 
business.21 
Unions and other employee groups, of course, exist and are able to achieve 
gains.22  The incongruity with neoclassical theory illustrates its limits, yet the 
underlying tension between workers’ attempts to obtain better work conditions 
and the competitive pressures faced by employers still remains relevant in the 
global economy.  Indeed, a brief look at some of the explanations for workers’ 
ability to exact benefits from firms—including workers’ exerting monopolistic 
pressure, improving firm productivity, and capturing employer rents—shows 
how this type of pressure has become more difficult as the economy has 
become more globalized. 
1. Employee Control of the Labor Market 
The traditional explanation for employee collective action—particularly in 
the union context—is that workers possess monopolistic power that allows 
more gains for employees than would be possible in a perfectly competitive 
market.  The literature on this explanation is extensive,23 but its major 
argument is that employee groups with significant control over the supply of 
labor can achieve compensation levels and workplace conditions that would 
not otherwise be possible.  Although this may explain a significant portion of 
 
 18. Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private-Sector Unionism: 
What Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1146 (2007) (citing RICHARD B. 
FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 52 (1999)). 
 19. See Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act Local”:  Employee Representation in a 
World of Global Labor and Product Market Competition, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81, 84 (2009). 
 20. See Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the 
Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 426 (1992) (citing 
data on union wage premiums). 
 21. See id. at 426–27. 
 22. See id. at 426. 
 23. See, e.g., id. at 471 (noting that few unions currently have monopolistic power). 
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union and other employee group victories in the past, monopolistic pressure is 
increasingly hard to come by in the global labor market. 
A union with monopolistic power—for instance, the United Auto Workers 
decades ago24—has different means of exerting that pressure.  One strategy is 
to demand more compensation from a given firm, depending on that firm’s 
ability to pay.  This “price discrimination” can earn more for workers if 
successful; it is a risky strategy, however, because an employer could decide 
not to purchase any labor at that price, as might happen during a lockout or 
when an employer is willing to accept a strike rather than pay the demanded 
wages.25  Price discrimination is thus more common against employers with 
specialized labor demands or other conditions that allow the firm less ability to 
reject demands for higher wages.  Such employers have a low “elasticity of 
demand” for labor, meaning that their demand for labor stays relatively stable 
in the face of wage increases.26  The concept of demand elasticity is an 
important one because it is a major determinant in whether unions’ and other 
employee groups’ pressure for increased compensation will be successful.27 
The second means of employee or union pressure focuses on controlling 
the supply of labor by restricting the availability of nonunion workers or other 
workers not intended to benefit from the collective action.28  Although 
reducing the labor supply lowers the number of workers who get jobs, the 
strategy increases compensation for those who are employed.29  Unions or 
employee groups with enough strength to exert monopolistic pressure are 
better able to restrict the supply of labor, but even weaker groups can use this 
strategy.  Efforts to implement firm-specific training or licensing requirements, 
among other barriers to entry, can assist all workers in a given industry by 
restricting the supply of labor.30  Workers can also try to make alternate 
sources of labor—for instance, foreign workers—more expensive by engaging 
in activities such as encouraging sympathy strikes during a labor dispute, 
 
 24. The United Auto Workers had control over the supply of employees to American 
automakers prior to the steep declines in the U.S. auto industry.  See Daniel J. Gifford, Labor 
Policy in Late Twentieth Century Capitalism: New Paradoxes for the Democratic State, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 85, 116–17 (1997); see also infra note 59 (discussing SAG Global One Rule). 
 25. See Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 997 
(1984). 
 26. See Thomas Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1008, 1020, 
1022 (1986). 
 27. See id. at 1017 (demonstrating the correlation between compensation and demand). 
 28. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 427. 
 29. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 1006.  Employers will be willing to pay more to hire 
from a smaller pool of workers—in other words, if employers want to keep the same level of 
employment when the supply of labor goes down, wages must go up.  We are currently seeing the 
opposite situation; as the supply of available workers has increased (because of significant 
layoffs), employers can pay less to hire workers from the expanded pool of labor. 
 30. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 427. 
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discouraging other workers from working for lower wages, and asking 
consumers to avoid employers using alternate forms of labor.31  Finally, 
obtaining legal protections can be a successful means of restricting labor 
supply, particularly for nonunion employee groups, which often lack the ability 
to use other forms of pressure.32 
An important caveat to these strategies is that employers’ demand 
elasticity is a significant limitation on the ability of workers to achieve benefits 
by restricting the supply of labor.  An employer that is less sensitive to wage 
increases—that is, an employer with a relatively inelastic demand for labor—
will be willing to pay more for a shrinking pool of workers than an employer 
with more sensitive, or elastic, demand for labor.33  This means that employees 
with some control over the supply of labor will be able to extract more 
compensation from the former type of employer.  Employers’ enhanced ability 
to hire workers or outsource, however, means that an inelastic demand for 
labor is not the norm. 
2. Increasing Productivity and Capturing Rents 
Two other explanations for workers’ ability to extract gains from 
employers in a competitive market are the opportunity for workers to increase 
firm productivity or to capture firm rents.34  Both explanations are relevant to 
the formal union/employer collective bargaining relationship, but like the 
monopolistic pressure theory, they may explain some collective action 
successes or opportunities in the global economy. 
 
 31. As Judge Richard Posner has noted, workers will be wary of crossing a picket line when, 
as is often the case, there is a good chance that they will have to work next to striking employees 
in the future.  See Posner, supra note 25, at 998; Campbell, supra note 26, at 1034. 
 32. Estreicher, supra note 19, at 84–85 (citing tariffs, minimum-wage laws, immigration 
law, and extension laws).  Unions, however, also use legal protections to their advantage.  See 
Campbell, supra note 26, at 1006.  Examples of legal protection include minimum wage laws, 
prevailing wage requirements, and the Davis-Bacon Act.  As Professor Estreicher notes, legal 
changes also hampered unions’ ability to control the labor supply by prohibiting certain types of 
pressure on employers not directly involved in a labor dispute.  Estreicher, supra note 19, at 87 
(describing 1947 and 1959 amendments to the NLRA restricting unions’ ability to use secondary 
pressure). 
 33. Milton Friedman, Some Comments on the Significance of Labor Unions for Economic 
Policy, in THE IMPACT OF THE UNION:  EIGHT ECONOMIC THEORISTS EVALUATE THE LABOR 
UNION MOVEMENT 204, 207 (David McCord Wright ed., 1956). 
 34. Another explanation that is generally relevant only in a formal union collective 
bargaining context is the ability of unions and employers to bargain off the labor supply curve.  
The traditional bargaining model assumes that a monopolistic union sets a wage rate upon which 
employers choose how much labor to use.  Unions and employers, however, can engage in more 
nuanced bargaining that involves options—such as various combinations of wages and 
employment levels—that the parties prefer to the options that lie on the traditional monopolistic 
supply curve.  See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 423–24. 
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Economists Richard Freeman and James Medoff notably argued that one 
way unions can secure improvements for workers is by increasing an 
employer’s productivity.35  Although Professors Freeman and Medoff focused 
on traditional trade unions, factors associated with fostering productivity gains 
suggest that less formal employee groups could also improve firm 
performance.  These factors include improving morale, especially by supplying 
information about employees’ preferences to employers and by giving 
employees voice in the workplace;36 monitoring managers and other 
employees;37 convincing the employer to implement changes that help all 
employees but that no one employee could negotiate;38 and assisting internal 
grievance procedures.39  If these claims are accurate, they could be particularly 
relevant in an increasingly competitive global economy.40 Empirical evidence 
on unions’ productivity effects, however, has been mixed, with some studies 
finding significant improvements and others finding none.41 
A further explanation of employee gains in a competitive market is the 
ability to capture what is referred to as employer “rents” or “quasi-rents.”  
Basically, these rents describe an employer’s ability to achieve more revenue 
than is required to produce a good.42  Because this revenue is in excess of what 
the employer would receive in a perfectly competitive market, employees are 
theoretically able to capture part of the rents without putting the employer out 
of business.43  This excess revenue may exist where an employer has 
 
 35. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 97, 101 (1984). 
 36. See id. at 95 (noting that increased voice can decrease quit rates); Posner, supra note 25, 
at 1000. 
 37. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 431 (noting that union can help monitor with a lower 
fear of retaliation). 
 38. Id.  One such “collective good” is “just cause” protection, which restricts an employer’s 
ability to terminate employees (for example, terminations may be permitted only for a valid 
business reason or for a specific list of reasons).  Just cause protection could improve productivity 
by encouraging senior employees to share information with the employer without fear of being 
terminated—a fear that is particularly strong given senior employees’ relatively high wages.  See 
Posner, supra note 25, at 1000. 
 39. Estreicher, supra note 19, at 85. 
 40. See infra notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
 41. See MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW 22 (6th ed. 2007) (citing Maryellen R. 
Kelley & Bennett Harrison, Unions, Technology, and Labor-Management Cooperation, in 
UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 247, 269 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 
1992) (finding approximately 30% increase in metal working industry)); Barry T. Hirsch, What 
Do Unions Do for Economic Performance?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 415, 430 (2004) (concluding that 
there is no average effect of unions on productivity). 
 42. See BARRY T. HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS 209 
(1986); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 428. 
 43. But see HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 42, at 214 (expressing doubt about significant 
rent capture in concentrated industries). 
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monopolistic power,44 an employer produces a good that is unusually 
productive or scarce within the market,45 or an employer has invested in highly 
specialized equipment.46 
It is difficult to pinpoint the magnitude of the effect of possible 
productivity improvements or rent capture.  Yet, to the extent that workers can 
take advantage of these opportunities, the expansion of global competition has 
a significant, and largely negative, impact on those efforts.  As employers face 
an increasing number of firms competing against them, the likelihood of 
employer rents—and the size of such existing rents—decreases.  Whether the 
impact of increased competition is insurmountable still remains to be seen. 
3. Effects of Globalism on Employee Collective Action 
Globalism has significantly impacted all strategies for employee collective 
action.47  Whether workers attempt to limit the labor supply or exert other 
types of monopolistic behavior or capture some of the increased productivity 
that they offer firms or capture employer rents, globalism has made their task 
more difficult.  The extent of globalism’s impact is highly case-specific, 
however, so general lessons must be considered in tandem with the 
circumstances of a given case. 
One of the biggest impacts of globalism is its effect on the ability of 
employees to limit labor supply to their advantage.  Employers’ enhanced 
capacity to expand their production chains across much of the world, whether 
directly or through subcontractors, presents two related problems for 
employees.  First, a global labor market is far more difficult for employees of a 
given country to influence than a smaller, more local market.48  Second, to the 
extent that employee groups still retain some control over the supply of labor, 
globalism has made employers’ demand for labor more elastic.  The 
availability of workers from different corners of the world increases the pool of 
labor, making it easier to resist worker demands.49  For instance, an employer’s 
 
 44. These “market power rents” allow employers to profit above the normal, competitive 
rate of return.  See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 428–29. 
 45. These rents are called “Ricardian rents.”  Id. at 429. 
 46. These “quasi-rents” may occur if an investment in specialized equipment locks the 
employer into use the equipment for a period of time—allowing employees to capture some of its 
value.  Id. at 430.  In the long run, however, an employer can adjust its capital investments to 
avoid these quasi-rents.  See Friedman, supra note 33, at 207–08. 
 47. For a discussion of globalization’s effect on international labor standards, or lack 
thereof, see generally Kevin Banks, The Impact of Globalization on Labour Standards: A Second 
Look at the Evidence, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 77 (John D.R. 
Craig & S. Michael Lynk eds., 2006). 
 48. See Stone, supra note 2, at 571 (discussing globalism’s effect on labor organizations). 
 49. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 1022 (discussing subcontracting’s effect on the elasticity 
of labor demand).  Friedman notes four factors affecting an employer’s demand elasticity for 
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ability to eventually shift jobs to workers in a different country makes that 
employer better able to resist strikes and other types of pressure from 
incumbent workers.50  Technological advances have made this reality more 
potent, as enhanced communication and transportation capabilities have made 
outsourcing labor more cost effective.51 
The increase in global competition and the availability of foreign labor also 
limits employees’ ability to capture employer rents—in large part because 
globalism has reduced the quantity of such rents and the magnitude of rents 
that do exist.  Although employer rents still occur—especially through the 
lock-in effect that may accompany significant employer investments52—
globalism in general has made this strategy less effective. 
In contrast, the effect of unions and other advocacy groups represents a 
rare opportunity for workers in the global economy.  The expansion of 
competitive markets around the world means that workers are not the only 
ones facing increased pressure; employers have also had to confront a 
significant rise in the level of competition.  If unions or employee groups are 
able to enhance an employer’s productivity, without capturing all of the 
benefits of that productivity increase, then the employees could be an 
important factor in whether the employer stays in business.  Increased 
competition, however, has also put more of a premium on business flexibility, 
which makes the relatively slow collective-bargaining model of traditional 
unions less desirable.53  Thus, workers’ ability to act through more flexible and 
non-adversarial entities represents a partial solution to the challenges of global 
collective action.54 
 
labor; demand for labor will be more inelastic:  “(1) the more essential the given item is in the 
production of the final product, (2) the more inelastic the demand for the final product, (3) the 
smaller fraction  of total costs accounted for by the item in question, and (4) the more inelastic the 
supply of co-operating factors.”  See Friedman, supra note 33, at 207 (noting that the first and 
third factors are the most significant) (citing ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 
385–86 (8th ed. 1920)). 
 50. See Charles B. Craver, The Labor Movement Needs a Twenty-First Century Committee 
for Industrial Organization, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 69, 83–84 (2005) (noting 
globalization’s negative impact on American job opportunities and wages); Posner, supra note 
25, at 1002. 
 51. See Justin K. Holcombe, Solutions for Regulating Offshore Outsourcing in the Service 
Sector: Using the Law, Market, International Mechanisms, and Collective Organization as 
Building Blocks, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 539, 542 (2005); Stone, supra note 2, at 571; 
Estreicher, supra note 19, at 87. 
 52. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 917; Estreicher, supra note 10, at 10; John T. Addison 
& Barry T. Hirsch, The Economic Effects of Employment Regulation: What Are the Limits?, in 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 125, 165–66 (Bruce E. 
Kaufman ed., 1997). 
 54. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
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Moreover, globalism has spread certain industries to new parts of the 
world.  These developing countries represent an opportunity for unions or 
employee groups.  If workers can sell themselves to employers in these 
countries as a source of expertise about a relatively new business, then the 
workers can improve firm performance and capture part of that increase in new 
business for themselves. 
II.  OPTIONS FOR EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE ACTION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
Globalism’s rise may well represent a permanent constraint on traditional 
collective bargaining.  Although formal union representation and bargaining is 
unlikely to disappear completely, it is even less likely that we will see the level 
of union density that existed in the 1950s.55  Increased competition, both for 
workers and employers, in combination with the natural turnover of labor 
markets, makes widespread coverage by traditional unions inconceivable 
absent radical changes in labor law.56  But that reality does not doom all forms 
of employee collective action.  Instead, it has (or it at least should) transform 
the means by which workers attempt to exert pressure on employers. 
As employees’ ability to exert monopolistic-like pressure or capture 
employer rents decreases, the goals of collective action must also change.  
Employees, as well as policymakers, need to be cognizant of the problems they 
are addressing and formulate their strategies accordingly.  Globalism’s effect 
on the workplace is complex, and it is difficult to identify precisely what issues 
should be targeted.  But several issues that are frequently mentioned include 
the need to correct market failures; avoid a race-to-the-bottom among low-
labor-cost countries; take into account human rights concerns; and overcame 
coordination problems, such as low trust among countries seeking to enforce 
basic labor standards.57  The severity of these issues and others in various 
 
 55. Private-sector union density has been estimated as high as 35.7% in 1953.  See LEO 
TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION SOURCEBOOK A-1–A-2 (1985). 
 56. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 18, at 1144–45. 
 57. Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory 
Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 203, 206–07 (2007); 
Alan Hyde, A Game Theory Account and Defense of Transnational Labour Standards—A 
Preliminary Look at the Problem, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 143, 
149–50 (John D.R. Craig & S. Myles Lynk eds. 2006) (describing low trust as a major 
impediment to international labor improvements and a reason for implementing transnational 
labor standards that may build trust among parties).  These issues mentioned are merely intended 
as a sample of those frequently cited, even though empirical support may be lacking for some of 
them.  See, e.g., Kristen H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and 
Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 348 (1997) (noting doubts about “race-to-the-
bottom” argument).  Moreover, some issues—such as low trust—may be considered part of the 
broader market failure category. 
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contexts will help determine which form of collective action is most 
appropriate and most likely to benefit workers. 
At present, the effectiveness of various forms of international collective 
action has been mixed.  Isolated successes exist, but it is far more difficult to 
identify any long-term strategies that would provide a blueprint for worker 
gains around the world.  Despite this bleak outlook, there remains hope that 
workers—particularly with the assistance of governments—can establish 
themselves as meaningful players in the world economy.  Whether and how 
that may occur is not clear, but it is likely to involve some combination of 
strategies that are protected and encouraged by government action.  These 
strategies include coordinating between foreign employees, pressuring 
employers to adopt codes of conduct or other labor standard agreements, 
seeking new forms of employee organizations, and encouraging governments 
to establish and enforce basic labor standards.58  None of these strategies is a 
panacea, yet they serve as the best options available to address the problems 
that workers face in the global economy. 
A. Coordination and Transnational Organizations 
Although traditional unions have had a difficult time maintaining 
membership in the global economy—much less monopolistic power59—they 
still remain among the most significant players in seeking out new collective-
action strategies.  One of these strategies involves working with unions and 
other employee groups in different countries or even forming new entities that 
include employee groups from around the world.60 
This cooperative approach recognizes that as business becomes more 
global in nature, employee collective action must as well.  Indeed, international 
 
 58. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 926–27 (citing examples); John Russo, Strategic 
Campaigns and International Collective Bargaining: The Case of IBT, FIET, and Royal Ahold 
NV, 24 LAB. STUD. J. 23, 34–35 (1999) (describing earlier problems with global collective 
action). 
 59. One rare exception is the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), which represents a unique pool of 
labor in an equally unique industry, thereby giving it enough power to enforce its “Global Rule 
One.”  This rule prohibits any SAG member from working with a producer anywhere in the world 
who does not have a contract with SAG or provide compensation that approximates what is 
guaranteed by a SAG contract.  See SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS, at 34–
35 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.sag.org/files/documents/2007%20October%20SAG%20 
Constitution%20and%20By-Laws.pdf; Hirsch, supra note 17, at 614–16 (discussing SAG’s 
unique situation and Global Rule One); Gail Frommer, Hooray for . . . Toronto?  Hollywood, 
Collective Bargaining, and Extraterritorial Union Rules in an Era of Globalization, 6 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 85–86 (2003) (discussing SAG’s Global Rule One). 
 60. See generally Ian Greer & Marco Hauptmeier, Political Entrepreneurs and Co-
Managers: Labour Transnationalism at Four Multinational Auto Companies, 46 BRIT. J. INDUS. 
REL.  76 (2008) (discussing transnational efforts in auto industry and determining that such 
efforts can increase solidarity among workers and transform relationships with employers). 
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coordination represents one of the ironies of globalization: the technological 
advances that have allowed employers to expand their chains of production 
throughout the world and diminish workers’ influence over their employment 
conditions have in turn provided workers with more tools and opportunities to 
pressure employers for better conditions.61  Every expansion of an employer’s 
presence throughout the world provides its workers with an additional target 
for collective action.  These additional locations can be particularly useful if 
the workers are able coordinate with their foreign colleagues to exert 
widespread pressure against the employer, no matter where the primary dispute 
occurs. 
The possibility of coordinated collective action is aided by a further irony.  
Globalism’s expansion of the world-wide labor market, and the resulting 
downward pressure on wages, has made employees more open to the 
possibility of engaging in collective action.62  Many problems still exist in 
coordinating employee action,63 but the strategy is likely to continue to 
represent an important feature in the arsenal of workers. 
There are numerous examples of international coordination among unions 
and other employee groups—usually efforts that have occurred on an ad hoc 
basis.  One such instance is the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
and its ability to achieve benefits for American workers by targeting 
employers’ operations in other countries.  Among the SEIU’s attempts to 
broaden American-based labor disputes are its protests against European-
owned hotels in their home countries64 and coordination with French unions to 
pressure Sodexho, a multinational food service employer based in France, to 
stop fighting organizing attempts among its American work force.65  The SEIU 
has been active in non-European countries as well, including building 
 
 61. See Charles Heckscher, Organizations, Movements, and Networks, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 313, 331 (2005–2006) (noting that multinational corporations are often vulnerable to rapid, 
targeted pressure, especially via the Internet). 
 62. See Jackie Smith, Economic Globalization and Labor Rights: Towards Global 
Solidarity?, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 873, 877 (2006); Dau-Schmidt, supra 
note 3, at 918–21. 
 63. For instance, coordination generally requires a certain level of resources and expertise 
that many employee groups lack.  See Frank Borgers, Global Unionism—Beyond the Rhetoric: 
The CWA North Atlantic Alliance, 24 LAB. STUD. J. 107, 109–11 (1999) (discussing coordination 
attempts by Communication Workers of America); infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 922; see also Matt Bai, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Jan. 30, 2005, at 44–45. 
 65. The Sodexho pressure took advantage of the company’s reputation in Europe as being 
union-friendly, and ultimately led to a neutrality pledge by the company.  See Bai, supra note 64, 
at 45. 
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relationships with China’s official labor union, the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (AFTCU).66 
Another international coordination effort was an influential factor in the 
1997 strike against United Parcel Service, one of the most influential in recent 
memory.  The International Brotherhood of Teamsters has stated that support 
from international unions—including a “World Action Day” of 
demonstrations, sympathy strikes, and sickouts in support of the American 
union—helped it achieve virtually all of its aims during the strike against 
UPS.67 
In addition, the garment industry has produced some of the most high-
profile international coordination efforts, as major companies such as Nike and 
Gap have become embroiled in well-publicized international labor troubles.68  
These retail businesses are particularly susceptible to picketing, advertising, 
and other consumer-oriented publicity, aimed at decreasing demand for goods 
made under substandard labor conditions.69  This collective activity can both 
improve conditions for nonunionized workers in foreign countries and for 
American workers who benefit indirectly from the added labor costs involved 
with such improvements.  Moreover, successful coordination efforts can lead 
to more formal organizing efforts among previously nonunion workplaces, as 
Nike discovered through its experiences with one of its Mexican contractors.70 
Professors Alan Hyde and Mona Ressaissi recently explored the 
effectiveness of these types of international coordination efforts, which they 
refer to as “transnational unionism,” and have made several important 
recommendations.71  For instance, Hyde and Ressaissi stress the need for 
cooperative efforts that are permanent, strategic, and reciprocal—particularly 
where one of the goals is to improve trust or to remove other barriers to 
coordinated activity.72  Unlike more ad hoc arrangements, these types of efforts 
 
 66. The United Autoworkers Union (UAW) has also been actively engaging with the 
AFTCU, a currently feckless state-run union that has the potential—albeit unmet—to actually 
help workers.  See Union Leader Sees Possibility of Changed Chinese Labor Union, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 97, at A-4 (May 22, 2009). 
 67. See Stephen B. Moldof, Union Responses to the Challenges of an Increasingly 
Globalized Economy, 5 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 119, 133 (2005). 
 68. See generally Rob van Tulder & Ans Kolk, Multinationality and Corporate Ethics: 
Codes of Conduct in the Sporting Goods Industry, 32 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 267 (2001) (providing 
overview of sporting goods codes of conduct). 
 69. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 70. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Alan Hyde & Mona Ressaissi, Unions Without Borders: Recent Developments in the 
Theory, Practice and Law of Transnational Unionism, 14 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 47, 48 (2008). 
 72. See id. at 75; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text; see generally Henry J. 
Frundt, Four Models of Cross-Border Maquila Organizing, in UNIONS IN A GLOBALIZED 
ENVIRONMENT 45 (Bruce Nissen ed., 2002) (discussing challenges to transnational union efforts). 
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are likely to promote trust among the involved groups, which can result in 
significant achievement for all sides as the relationship develops. 
Hyde and Ressaissi’s analysis of international coordination highlight the 
tradeoff between easier-to-attain, but less valuable, ad hoc coordination efforts 
and more valuable, but less attainable, permanent transnational unionism.  
Some commentators have described ad hoc cooperation efforts as largely 
ineffective.73  Yet, as described above, many ad hoc campaigns have achieved 
real gains for workers.74  The difference may be definitional, as “success” can 
be defined as including incremental improvements or as something more 
substantial and permanent.75  As Hyde and Ressaissi emphasize, ad hoc 
campaigns promise far less stable coordination efforts—particularly from the 
perspective of non-American employees and unions.76  But ad hoc attempts 
can still be helpful even if they are suboptimal.  For example, Hyde and 
Ressaissi describe the American UNITE union’s missteps in its efforts to 
coordinate with other unions against Swedish retailer H&M.77  As they note, 
however, one outcome of those efforts was a subsequent card-check 
recognition for another union and a large unit of employees involved in a later 
dispute.78  Later, H&M and the other union entered into a collective bargaining 
agreement that increased wages, expanded benefits, and established a joint 
union-management committee to enhance worker voice.79  Although more 
permanent coordination efforts would have been more beneficial—especially 
for UNITE—some workers did achieve gains as a result of the unions’ ad hoc 
efforts. 
 
 73. See Hyde & Ressaissi, supra note 71, at 73 (“[I]t is hard to find a successful recent 
transnational ad hoc campaign of union support.”); see also Pablo Ghigliani, International Trade 
Unionism in a Globalizing World: A Case Study of  New Labour Internationalism, 26 ECON. & 
INDUS. DEMOCRACY 359, 377–78 (2005) (describing limited gains in five-day effort by European 
unions and NGOs to challenge McDonald’s labor practices). 
 74. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 75. See, e.g., Hyde & Ressaissi, supra note 73, at 48 (“As a means of overcoming collective 
action problems and achieving stable transnational regulation, transnational institutions are far 
superior to ad hoc campaigns that in practice often exacerbate low trust.”) (emphasis added). 
 76. See Peter Fairbrother et al., Unions Facing the Future: Questions and Possibilities, 31 
LAB. STUD. J. 31, 45–46 (2007) (describing Italian steel unions’ pressure against German 
multinational corporation as being successful in Italy, but foundering when the unions attempt to 
expand the dispute to other countries). 
 77. See Hyde & Ressaissi, supra note 73, at 72–73. 
 78. Id. at 73. 
 79. This development occurred after Hyde and Ressaissi finished their article.  See RWDSU 
First Contract With H&M Covers 1,000 Workers in Manhattan Stores, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), 
No. 99, at A-14 (May 27, 2009) (describing Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union 
contract that gives a minimum 3% wage increase, guaranteed minimum hours for full-time 
employees, and new leave and benefit provisions). 
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Moreover, the possible benefits of more permanent coordination efforts 
have limits as well.  Hyde and Ressaissi note two of the more successful 
transnational worker organizations: the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF) and European Works Councils.80  Both of these long-existing 
organizations are fairly unique.  The ITF—an example of a Global Union 
Federation (GUF) of national unions in the same industry81—represents 
merchant seamen on “flag-of-convenience” ships.82  These seamen are skilled 
employees with atypical jobs that involve significant periods of isolated travel.  
They also work in an industry with severe time-pressures that make employers 
particularly vulnerable to the delays in shipments that can occur with strikes 
and other employee collective action.83  Organizing these workers is much 
easier than in most other industries.  For that reason, most other GUFs are far 
less successful than the ITF.84 
Similarly, the successes of European Works Councils derive largely from 
one important fact—the organizations are protected and promoted by law.85  
Thus, the councils provide little solace for employees without equivalent legal 
protection.  The Works Councils do show, however, the importance of legal 
protection for employee collective action.  Where such protection exists, 
employees have a much better chance of achieving benefits.86 
The message from these various examples seems to be that ad hoc efforts 
can be useful, but that employee groups should strive to make them as 
permanent and comprehensive as possible.  The promise of more extensive ad 
hoc international coordination efforts was revealed in a labor dispute at one of 
 
 80. See Hyde & Ressaissi, supra note 73, at 53–54. 
 81. See id. at 57. 
 82. “Flag of convenience” ships are those that are registered in a certain country for the 
purpose of reducing costs or avoiding regulations.  See Iliana Christodoulou-Varotsi & Dmitri A. 
Pentsov, Labor Standards on Cypriot Ships:  Myth and Reality, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 647, 
649 (2004).  For a detailed description of the ITF and some of its successful actions, including 
those involving coordination with other employee groups, see generally Peter Turnbull, The War 
on Europe’s Waterfront—Repertoires of Power in the Port Transport Industry, 44 BRIT. J. INDUS. 
REL. 305 (2006). 
 83. See Hyde & Ressaissi, supra note 71, at 58 (noting also political regulations, 
dockworkers’ solidarity, and long history of the group). 
 84. See id.; see also Turnbull, supra note 82, at 320–21 (noting that the ITF was unique 
because, in part, the workers better appreciated the value of collective action, had a much higher 
union density, and were more active than most workers). 
 85. See Council Directive 94/45, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64, 65 (EC) (requiring works councils in 
all companies that had operations in multiple EU countries). 
 86. See Peter Wad, “Due Diligence” at APM-Maersk: From Malaysian Industrial Dispute 
to Danish Cross-Border Campaign, in GLOBAL UNIONS 40, 40–41, 43–45 (Kate Bronfenbrenner 
ed., 2007) (describing union’s success at Malaysian factory after thirty years of effort because of 
court holding). 
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Nike’s Mexican garment contractors.87  This dispute, and a similar one in 
Indonesia, involved the American employee rights group, Workers Rights 
Consortium (WRC).  As described by one of its participants, Professor Mark 
Barenberg, the WRC was able to achieve substantial benefits for workers by 
stressing, in part, the involvement of local Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and other groups that sought to protect employee rights.88 
The WRC formed out of protests by American university students against 
the conditions faced by foreign workers who manufactured clothing licensed to 
various schools.89  After student protestors objected to a weaker labor 
monitoring organization that was initially proposed,90 approximately 150 
schools joined with the newly formed WRC.91 
The WRC leadership included students, labor experts, and university 
administrators.92  The consortium established a set of principles that 
emphasized the need to remain neutral in disputes between management and 
apparel unions, involve local workers and communities, promote local jobs by 
insisting on continued investment by retailers and vendors, and publish 
information obtained through factory monitoring.93 
One of the WRC’s primary functions was to conduct audits of factories.  
These audits involved extensive interviewing of workers and stressed the 
involvement of local NGOs, local labor experts, community members, and on-
site workers.94  The WRC typically becomes involved at factories where 
workers have already instigated some action against unfair conditions—
including a Mexican factory that made apparel for Nike, Reebok, and other 
retailers, as well as an Indonesian factory that made apparel for Gap and 
others.95  The WRC’s experience in both plants revealed the potential gains 
from international cooperation among employee groups.96 
 
 87. The high-profile nature of the American garment industry was undoubtedly another 
factor in the workers’ ability to achieve improvements at work in this factory.  See supra notes 
31, 69 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Mark Barenberg, Legitimacy and Capacity in Private Labor Monitoring: Two Case 
Studies, in COMPENSATION, WORK HOURS AND BENEFITS 39, 45–46 (Jeffrey M. Hirsch ed., 
2009); Katie Quan, Strategies for Garment Worker Empowerment in the Global Economy, 10 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 27, 33 (2003). 
 89. See Barenberg, supra note 88, at 41. 
 90. See id. at 42. 
 91. Id. at 39. 
 92. Id. at 42. 
 93. Id. at 42–43 (noting that WRC would not certify factories as being compliant with labor 
rights). 
 94. Barenberg, supra note 88, at 22–93. 
 95. Id. at 45, 47, 59. 
 96. Id. at 70. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] MAKING GLOBALISM WORK FOR EMPLOYEES 445 
In Mexico, the Kukdong factory was a South Korean owned garment plant 
that had Nike as its highest-profile retailer.97  The workers in the plant had 
complained to the WRC about violations of basic labor standards98 and sought 
to create an independent union that would replace the incumbent union, an 
affiliate of a state-controlled federation that the workers viewed as corrupt and 
uninterested in helping them.99  The WRC conducted several days of 
interviews and issued multiple reports on the need for remedial action, 
including a cooperative effort among local workers, local employee groups and 
NGOs, international employee groups and NGOs, and apparel retailers such as 
Nike that would address the problems at the plant.100 
The retailers initially resisted the WRC’s recommendations, but after 
continued pressure by workers, the WRC, and the media, the WRC eventually 
agreed to substantive changes.101  Those changes occurred gradually—and 
often only as the result of pressure by the WTC’s university members—but 
ultimately produced significant improvements for the Kukdong workers.102  
These improvements included the expulsion of the corrupt incumbent union, 
recognition of a union elected by a large majority of workers, the formation of 
a collective-bargaining agreement with the new union, and a promise by plant 
officials to comply with a Nike code of conduct.103 
The WRC’s successful cooperation with local groups at Kukdong was 
repeated in the PT Dada apparel plant in Indonesia, which made clothes for 
companies such as Gap, Adidas, and Disney.104  The story at PT Dada was 
very similar to Kukdong: workers went on strike and protested substandard 
labor conditions.105  Unlike Kukdong, however, the PT Dada plant had three 
independent unions seeking to represent workers,106 none of which were 
 
 97. Id. at 47. 
 98. Id. (noting conditions such as physical abuse, child labor, minimum wage violations, and 
sick and maternity leave violations). 
 99. Barenberg, supra note 88, at 47. 
 100. Id. at 48–49, 53.  For further discussion of the Kukdong action and other employee 
groups involvement, see generally César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, Nike’s Law: The Anti-
Sweatshop Movement, Transnational Corporations, and the Struggle Over International Labor 
Rights in the Americas, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW 64 (Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005). 
 101. See Barenberg, supra note 88, at 53–58. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 58; see also infra notes 144–146 and accompanying text (discussing WRC codes of 
conduct). 
 104. See Barenberg, supra note 88, at 59. 
 105. Id. at 60 (noting complaints of forced unpaid work, corporal punishment against workers 
taking sick leave, and other physical and verbal abuse). 
 106. Id. 
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clearly favored by a majority of workers, although the plant management 
strongly supported one of them.107 
After the WRC became involved at the PT Dada plant, it again enlisted 
cooperation from local groups; local employees, NGOs, and labor experts 
made up half of the assessment team conducting an initial audit at the plant.108  
Moreover, learning from the initial difficulties with remediation in Kukdong, 
in which its compliance audit team had only a small number of local groups, 
the WRC’s PT Dada compliance team was comprised almost entirely of local 
labor advocates and experts.109  The belief was that a local team would have 
more flexibility and knowledge to secure improvements at the plant, 
particularly given the difficulties in sorting out the three competing unions.110  
This belief was confirmed as plant officials eventually began to bargain with 
all three unions, which formed a coordinated bargaining committee.111  As was 
the case in Kukdong, the PT Dada workers also saw improvements, including 
employer commitments to free association and improvements in leave 
policies.112 
Although the WRC’s successes were due to many factors,113 its emphasis 
on meaningful coordination and deference to local groups was important.114  In 
addition, the WRC’s experiences demonstrate the importance of establishing 
legal recognition of the right to engage in international coordinated collective 
action.115  Without such protection, employers will be able to stamp out such 
efforts through terminations and other punitive measures.  For example, 
countries have very different rules regarding work stoppages, particularly those 
in sympathy with a foreign labor organization or against a company with 
which they do not have a direct conflict.116  Thus, unions and other employee 
groups must be cognizant of these legal differences before engaging in 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 61. 
 109. Barenberg, supra note 88, at 62, 67. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 66. 
 112. Id. at 67–68. 
 113. Other factors include, at PT Dada, the competency of some local labor officials.  See id. 
at 70. 
 114. Barenberg, supra note 88, at 73–74; see also Ashwini Sukthanker & Kevin Kolben, 
Indian Labor Legislation and Cross-Border Solidarity in Historical Context, in GLOBAL UNIONS 
57, 68–77 (Kate Bronfenbrenner ed., 2007) (describing failure of foreign trade unions, and 
success of international cooperative initiative, in helping Indian workers). 
 115. See Hyde & Ressaissi, supra note 71, at 50–52. 
 116. The NLRA, for instance, prohibits many types of “secondary pressure” that attempt to 
draw a neutral employer in a dispute with a different employer.  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) 
(2006) (prohibiting encouragement of an employee to strike or refusal to handle goods, or 
coercion of person engaged in commerce, for the purpose of “forcing or requiring any person to 
cease . . . doing business with any other person”); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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coordinated pressure involving foreign employers.117  This concern also 
suggests need for reform. 
Globalism has expanded competition in product and labor markets, and 
thus, domestic labor laws should be changed to reflect this new competitive 
environment.  One such reform would be to permit work stoppages and other 
types of economic pressure against employers currently protected from such 
activity because another employer is the primary target, especially when these 
protected employers are subcontractors of a foreign primary employer.118 
B. Codes of Conduct and Global Framework Agreements 
Although international coordination has been important, the most 
publicized type of global employee collective action involves what are referred 
to as either “codes of conduct” or “global framework agreements.”119  These 
terms eschew precise definitions, but basically involve companies and possibly 
their contractors, promising to comply with some set of labor policies and 
obligations.120  These policies come from many sources, although their core 
provisions often emulate the basic rights embodied in conventions such as that 
of the International Labor Organization (ILO).121  Companies often agree to 
 
 117. For instance, Hyde and Ressaissi note a European Court of Justice case that restricted 
international labor efforts.  In that case, the court held that a EU directive—which allows a 
foreign company to hire workers from its country rather than the country in which it is 
performing, as long as those workers are given the terms of employee guaranteed by the host 
country or applicable collective agreements—provided both minimum and maximum protection 
for employees, thereby prohibiting labor unions from pressuring the company for additional 
benefits.  Thus, a multinational company with business in Europe will be shielded from certain 
types of labor pressure.  See Hyde & Ressaissi, supra note 71, at 87–90 (citing Laval un Partneri 
Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, 2008 O.J. (C341/05)). 
 118. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 119. Global framework agreements may also be called “global labor agreements” or 
“international framework agreements.”  See Jill Murray, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Labour 
Standards, in MASTERING THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION: TOWARDS A TRADE UNION 
AGENDA 47, 47 (Robert Kyloh ed., 1998); Owen E. Herrnstadt,  Are International Framework 
Agreements a Path to Corporate Social Responsibility?, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 187, 188 
(2007). 
 120. See Murray, supra note 119, at 47. Codes of conduct have been described as “formal 
policies which purport to shape corporate conduct in certain ways.”  Id.  These policies are 
implemented through compliance codes, which are defined as “directive statements giving 
guidance and prohibiting certain kinds of conduct.”  Int’l Labor Org., Corporate Codes of 
Conduct, http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 
2010).  For an example of the text of a compliance code, see VOLKSWAGEN, INC., DECLARATION 
ON SOCIAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS AT VOLKSWAGEN (2002), http://www.imf 
metal.org/main/index.cfm?id=47&lid=2&olid=2&cid=7215. 
 121. The core ILO standards include: freedom of association; right to collective 
representation; elimination of compulsory labor; effective abolition of child labor; and 
elimination of workplace discrimination.  Int’l Labour Org., ILO: Declaration on Fundamental 
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adopt these codes in reaction to negative publicity and other types of 
pressure.122  Codes of conduct and global framework agreements have the 
potential to provide real gains for workers; they can, however, also amount to 
little more than a public relations ploy.123 
The difference between policies that are considered “codes of conduct” 
and those that rise to the level of “global framework agreement” highlight 
some of the factors needed to make such policies effective.  Unlike typical 
codes of conduct, which a company unilaterally implements, global framework 
agreements are created in conjunction with employee groups and usually 
involve compliance measures, application to suppliers and contractors, and 
some form of employee voice and participation in the workplace.124  Not 
surprisingly, global framework agreements are more effective than codes of 
conduct in advancing employee concerns, particularly where substantial 
monitoring,125 significant employee participation,126 and more established 
employee groups, such as unions, are involved.127  Yet even weaker codes 
remain one of few options for certain employees to achieve improvements in 
their work conditions.128  In China, for instance, codes of conduct have 
 
Principles and Rights to Work, 37 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1237–38 (1998).  Another 
international organization that, according to some, may also provide an opportunity for enhancing 
worker protections across the world is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.  See James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and 
Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
769, 772, 788–804 (2000). 
 122. The pressure is typically consumer-oriented.  See Arthurs, supra note 14, at 289; Quan, 
supra note 88, at 32–34. 
 123. See Hyde & Ressaissi, supra note 71, at 76; Richard Locke et al., Beyond Corporate 
Codes of Conduct: Work Organization and Labour Standards at Nike’s Suppliers, 146 INT’L 
LAB. REV. 21, 22 (2007). 
 124. Niklas Egels-Zande’n & Peter Hyllman, Evaluating Strategies for Negotiating Workers’ 
Rights in Transnational Corporations:  The Effects of Codes of Conduct and Global Agreements 
on Workplace Democracy, 76 J. BUS. ETHICS 207, 209 (2007); Herrnstadt, supra note 119, at 
188; JENNY HOLDCROFT, INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS: A PROGRESS REPORT 
18 (2006), http://www.imfmetal.org/files/06091210511779/WEB_sp_report_3-06.pdf (describing 
International Metalworkers Union’s approach to agreements and describing its agreements with 
various companies). 
 125. William B. Gould IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case for 
International Labor Standards, 80 NEB. L. REV. 715, 751–52 (2001); Jane Wills, Bargaining for 
the Space To Organize in the Global Economy: A Review of the Accor-IUF Trade Union Rights 
Agreement, 9 REV. INT’L POLIT. ECON. 675, 678 (2002). 
 126. See Locke et al., supra note 123, at 25–26, 38–39 (examining Nike’s code of conduct). 
 127. Niklas Egels-Zande´n & Peter Hyllman, Exploring the Effects of Union-NGO 
Relationships on Corporate Responsibility:  The Case of the Swedish Clothes Campaign, 64 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 303, 313 (2006); Locke et al., supra note 123, at 35. 
 128. See Hyde & Ressaissi, supra note 71, at 76 (using China as an example of a weaker code 
helping employees improve labor conditions). 
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provided much greater benefits to employees than domestic law or other types 
of collective action.129 
Although weaker codes can provide some benefit to workers, they are 
typically far inferior to strong framework agreements.  Weaker codes of 
conduct often end up disappointing workers because they lack a clear 
statement of company or contractor responsibility and fail to establish the 
monitoring or enforcement structures needed to make promises a reality.130  
Moreover, these codes may not only leave workers without any tangible 
improvements, but they may also act as window-dressings that undermine 
efforts to implement more substantive government or employee action.131 
In contrast, employer-adopted global framework agreements that include 
well-developed guarantees and effective compliance provisions can provide 
workers with substantial improvements.  This is particularly true where few 
other options are available, such as countries with little union presence or few 
legal protections for collective activity; but these benefits are significantly 
enhanced in countries with stronger labor laws.132  In addition, because 
employers can control the specifics of these policies, global framework 
agreements can provide more flexibility—a particularly valuable characteristic 
in the global economy—than other types of employee collective activity.133  
Effective monitoring also provides workers with information that can aid their 
attempts to seek compliance with existing agreements and to make future 
demands as new problems arise.134 
One of the first major codes of conduct involved the multinational banana 
company, Chiquita.  A major player in the world banana market, Chiquita’s 
self-promoted image as a socially responsible corporation began taking hits 
following claims that it poisoned its workers through pesticide exposure, 
engaged in extremely hostile antiunion activity, and was involved with 
 
 129. See id. and text accompanying note 87 (citing studies of codes of conduct operating in 
China). 
 130. See Locke et al., supra note 123, at 23. 
 131. Id. at 22; Egels-Zande’n & Hyllman, supra note 124, at 215 (noting company that, 
despite a code of conduct that stated its support of unions, refused to allow workers to voice their 
opinion about union representation). 
 132. Locke et al., supra note 123, at 24 (studying Nike’s code of conduct and its effectiveness 
in various countries and plants); see also Herrnstadt, supra note 119, at 192 (arguing that 
successful framework agreements “must cover the entire enterprise as well as all related entities 
of the enterprise. . . must, at a minimum, explicitly include [ILO] labor standards, referenced 
directly to the appropriate Conventions. . . must be effectively implemented through 
communication and education[, and] . . . must be enforced in a transparent, meaningful, and 
effective manner”). 
 133. See Locke et al., supra note 123, at 22. 
 134. Id. at 22–23. 
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political corruption in some of the Latin American countries in which it owned 
plantations.135 
Exhibiting some of the international coordination strategies discussed 
earlier,136 NGOs from these Latin American countries and the United States—
later joined by unions from the same countries—began publicizing the 
allegations and demanding that Chiquita adopt labor and environmental 
protections for its plantations workers.137  At first, Chiquita adopted its own 
code of conduct, with no input from employee groups.138  The code failed to 
promise any real changes which led to increased pressure on Chiquita, who 
ultimately signed an agreement with a set of NGOs and unions that was as 
multinational as the company itself.139  The agreement adopted numerous 
substantive provisions—including recognition of the right to unionize and bans 
against discrimination, child labor, and forced labor—and, importantly, also 
applied to Chiquita’s suppliers and contractors.140 
The Chiquita agreement demonstrated the ability of international employee 
groups to successfully pressure employers to make changes that benefits 
workers.  Most workers at Chiquita-owned plantations believed that the 
agreement’s provisions had resulted in better working conditions.141  Yet, 
workers at Chiquita’s contractors saw no benefits—a reminder that, despite the 
historic nature of the agreement, it had significant limits.142  In particular, the 
agreement’s implementation in contractor plantations suffered from inadequate 
monitoring and enforcement, which prevented employees from enjoying its 
promises.143 
The WRC codes—which can be considered a framework agreement 
because they are formed based on international norms and local needs, all with 
input from multiple sources144—further illustrate the importance of monitoring 
and cooperation in determining the effectiveness of an agreement’s labor 
protections.  The successes of WRC’s compliance work at the Kukdong and 
 
 135. See Lone Riisgaard, The IUF/COLSIBA—CHIQUITA Framework Agreement:  A Case 
Study 11 (Int’l Labour Office, Working Paper No. 94, 2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/ 
wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_101049.pdf; 
Mike Gallagher & Cameron McWhirter, Chiquita Secrets Revealed, CINN. ENQUIRER, May 3, 
1998, at A1. 
 136. See supra Part II.A. 
 137. See Riisgard, supra note 135, at 11. 
 138. Id. at 12. 
 139. Id. at 8. 
 140. Id. at 12. 
 141. Id. at 16–17. 
 142. Riisgard, supra note 135, at 14–15. 
 143. See id. at 14–15 (blaming, in part, NGOs and unions lack of experience in cooperating to 
enforce such agreements and difficulties in ensuring that interested parties had necessary 
information). 
 144. See Barenberg, supra note 88, at 45, 74. 
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PT Dada plants were due in large part to continuous and thorough monitoring, 
the involvement of numerous groups that included local organizations, and 
input from labor experts.145  This level of monitoring and remediation, 
however, requires a significant amount of resources.  Moreover, the fact the 
plants manufactured many visible consumer products aided in the WRC’s 
success.146  So the WRC’s accomplishments often will not be attainable for 
many workers.  Yet, the importance of detailed monitoring and participation 
from a variety of groups are lessons that can improve subsequent attempts to 
implement and enforce international framework agreements. 
In short, these agreements—while no panacea—offer the possibility of 
substantial benefits for workers if properly implemented.  Despite this promise, 
agreements with effective monitoring, employee participation, and coverage 
over all of the links of production appear to be underused at this point, with 
most existing in workplaces controlled by companies centered in Europe or the 
United States.147  Employee groups should address this underuse by increasing 
pressure for such agreements where appropriate, but in doing so, those groups 
must ensure that the agreements will accomplish more than satisfying public 
relations strategies.  In many instances, a lack of resources, inadequate legal 
protections, or a company that is able to resist employee pressure will make a 
substantial framework agreement impossible.  Where there is an opportunity 
for such an agreement, however, employee groups should remain open to this 
strategy and recognize that it can not only result in genuine gains for workers, 
but perhaps also establish footholds upon which future labor reforms can be 
built. 
C. Employee Group Organizational Reform 
Although pressuring employers for better working conditions captures the 
traditional concept of collective action, that strategy may ignore some of the 
needs of workers in the global economy.  In particular, the globalization of the 
labor market may require a shift from more traditional goals of collective 
activity towards different aims, such as the need for a consumer-oriented 
strategy.148  Under this strategy, employee groups would attempt to provide 
workers with services that are needed in an economy that has seen 
 
 145. See id. at 71–74. 
 146. See id. at 75. 
 147. See Demetris Stevis & Terry Davis, International Framework Agreements: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Global Unionism, in GLOBAL UNIONS, supra note 86, at 174, 
174–79; Harry Arthurs, Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the Global Economy: 
Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation, in LABOUR LAW IN AN 
ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 471, 487 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002) (stressing need for 
employee participation in establishing workplace codes). 
 148. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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improvements in communications technology, expansion of business 
production chains, and increasingly mobile workers. 
Many of these changes have had a direct impact on workers.  For example, 
in contrast to the static workforces that existed decades ago, workers 
frequently change employers,149 and these changes increasingly involve moves 
across national borders.  Work relationships are also becoming more flexible 
as employers are increasingly using temporary or contract labor.150  Similarly, 
a worker may be considered an independent contractor or some designation 
other than a formal employee, which affects that worker’s eligibility for 
employment and retirement benefits and coverage by various work laws.151 
The cruel irony is that, as the highly competitive global marketplace has 
created more of a need for employee collective action, it has also eliminated 
traditional unionism as an option for most workers.152  But even if formal 
collective bargaining is less viable than it once was, workers still have an 
unmet desire to express their views and push for changes in the workplace.153  
If, as seems apparent, traditional unionism is unable to fully meet this demand, 
then there is a growing need for new forms of employee groups—a need that is 
beginning to be addressed.  These attempts are still in their infancy and have 
the lack of meaningful success to prove it.  Their development and growth, 
however, could ultimately prove significant. 
Traditional unions—perhaps paradoxically—have led the development of 
these new forms of employee groups.154  These groups can serve many 
purposes, but typically assist workers in some manner, whether by providing 
an outlet for expressing views to an employer, providing services to 
members,155 or acting as a source of information.156 
 
 149. See Stone, supra note 2, at 92–94. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See, e.g., Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 344–45 (8th Cir. 
2006) (holding that worker was an independent contractor and cannot bring claim under Title 
VII); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) (setting forth multi-factor test for employee 
classification under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Sec’y of Labor, United 
States Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534–35 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Mednick v. 
Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing test for “employee” under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006) (excluding supervisors under NLRA). 
 152. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 18, at 1137–40 (describing reasons for decline in union 
density); supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 154. Hirsch, supra note 18, at 1148.  Given the decline in union density, it may not be 
paradoxical that unions are seeking different strategies to maintain their relevance. 
 155. Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the 
Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 827, 833–34 (1996) (arguing for 
more employee groups that provide services to members, such as professional development and 
job placement assistance). 
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A key challenge for employee groups in the global economy is the need to 
recognize the changes taking place and to adjust their strategies accordingly.  
For example, the rise of globalism has been accompanied by more temporary 
work relationships as employers increasingly use contractors or transient 
workers—often located in different countries—to either limit labor costs or to 
address short-term business needs.157  Although employee groups have begun 
to address the needs of workers in these situations, they need to do much more.  
One instance of a group attempting to meet the needs of temporary workers, 
although not directly involving the global labor market, is the Communication 
Workers of America’s (CWA) “WashTech” effort.  The CWA established 
WashTech to assist contract and temporary workers at Microsoft, but did not 
engage in any bargaining on their behalf.158  Because of the difficulties in 
organizing temporary workers, the CWA viewed less formal assistance as a 
more realistic and ultimately more helpful means of addressing some of these 
workers’ concerns.159  Yet, WashTech was viewed as so beneficial that it 
ultimately began formally representing certain groups of technology 
workers.160  The WashTech experience demonstrates that traditionally 
unrepresented workers often have an unmet need for some level of 
assistance—a need exacerbated by globalism and its increased competitive 
pressures.  WashTech also shows the benefits that can accrue to unions and 
other groups that address that need. 
Employee groups can organize members outside the representational 
context in other ways.  The AFL-CIO’s “Working America” group, for 
instance, does not engage in any representational activities.161  Instead, 
Working America encourages members to engage in various political 
actions162 and provides information to all workers through its database on 
companies’ executive compensation, outsourcing, and labor violations.163  
 
 156. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 18, at 1148 n.73. 
 157. Stone, supra note 2, at 990–97. 
 158. See Stone, supra note 2, at 234–35. For a detailed background of WashTech, see 
Danielle D. van Jaarsveld, Overcoming Obstacles to Worker Representation: Insights from the 
Temporary Agency Workforce, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 355, 373–84 (2005–2006). 
 159. See van Jaarsveld, supra note 158, at 367–77. 
 160. See Stone, supra note 2, at 235; Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation 
in the United States: Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385, 389–91 (2005–2006). 
 161. See Richard B. Freeman, From the Webbs to the Web: The Contribution of the Internet 
to Reviving Union Fortunes 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11298, 
2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11298; Hyde, supra note 160, at 389-90. 
 162. See Freeman, supra note 161, at 19. 
 163. See Lauren Snyder, Working America, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 589, 592 (2005–2006) 
(describing Working America’s efforts); Amy Joyce, Labor Web Site Keeps Tabs on Business: 
Workers Can Check Executive Salaries, Company Violations, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at D3. 
The Working America database, which maintains information on tens of thousands of companies, 
is available at http://www.workingamerica.org/jobtracker. 
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There are limits on what less formal organizations, like Working America, can 
accomplish for workers.  But such groups can be quite helpful, especially to 
workers who would benefit from more information about current or future 
employers—information that is increasingly difficult to obtain for firms with 
operations throughout the world.  Additionally, groups can provide portable 
services, including provisional insurance and retirement benefits for workers 
who frequently change employers or locations, no matter where or whether 
they are working.164 
Employee groups that continue to engage in more formal representation 
also need to take into account the new challenges posed by globalism.  One 
successful example of this new reality was an electrical machinery union’s 
reaction to General Electric’s (GE) rapid expansion into the global market.  
The Coordinated Bargaining Committee of GE and Westinghouse (CBC) had 
represented workers at GE since the 1960s,165 and as GE began to expand its 
reach across the world, the CBC responded by broadening its focus 
internationally.166  The CBC’s efforts included the type of international 
coordination with other unions described earlier,167 but the CBC also looked to 
different strategies, such as increasing efforts to educate workers about 
globalism and to incorporate workers’ views on the union’s efforts in this area, 
as well as pushing for minimum standards applicable to GE’s operations across 
the world.168  The CBC’s efforts, although not substantially transforming work 
conditions, did obtain significant wage and benefit increases.169  Given the 
hurdles to collective action in the current global economy, this outcome 
qualifies as a success. 
Employee groups have also sought to assist or organize nonunion 
workers—especially those with foreign ties—through different means, such as 
by focusing on issues outside of the workplace.170  The SEIU’s “Justice for 
Janitors” campaigns, which have generally focused on migrant workers, 
provide a good example.  Although these workers are often low-skilled and do 
 
 164. See Joni Hersch, A Workers’ Lobby to Provide Portable Benefits, in EMERGING LABOR 
MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 207, 214–15 (Richard B. Freeman et 
al. eds., 2005) (describing “The Portable Benefits Network,” now known as the “Freelancers 
Union”); Sarah N. Kelly & Christine Tramontano, Working Today, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 597, 
601 (2005–2006) (describing Working Today’s efforts). 
 165. Douglas Meyer, Building Union Power in the Global Economy: A Case Study of the 
Coordinated Bargaining Committee of General Electric Unions (CBC), 26 LAB. STUD. J. 60, 61 
(2001). 
 166. Id. at 61. 
 167. Id. at 69–70. 
 168. Id. at 61. 
 169. Id. at 74. 
 170. As this section describes, unions assistance is often motivated by a desire to organize 
workers. 
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not speak English well, the SEIU successfully organized many, in part by 
focusing on non-work related issues.171  For instance, a successful campaign in 
California focused on Mexican culture and involved local religious and 
political leaders.172  This campaign shows how employee concerns—especially 
those of migrant workers—often extend beyond the workplace. 
A similar effort between the AFL-CIO and the National Day Laborer 
Organizing Network (NDLON) further illustrates this point.  The two groups 
established the National Worker Center Partnership, which creates worker 
centers to assist mainly migrant laborers with a wide variety of services.173  
Efforts like these, which support workers on multiple fronts, will provide 
greater benefits and greater success for the groups involved.174 
Although these collective strategies hold promise, they are not without 
problems—particularly when they do not involve formal representation of 
workers.  The costs of establishing and maintaining an organization that does 
not receive regular dues or other forms of income must have some other source 
of funding.  This funding problem is exacerbated when a group lobbies on 
behalf of, or provides services for, all workers, rather than limiting benefits to 
members, due to the ability of non-member workers to “free ride” on the 
group’s efforts.175  Alternatively, these groups could seek to be more service-
oriented and avoid broad lobbying.  By focusing on the direct needs of a select 
unit of workers, employee groups could help those workers and maintain a 
source of regular funding at the same time.176 
 
 171. See Stone, supra note 2, at 224–25; Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in Silicon 
Valley: Networks, Ethnic Organization, and New Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 497 
(2001–2002). 
 172. See Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond: A 
New Form of Unionism in the Twenty-first Century?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS 22, 48 
(Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 2004). 
 173. See AFL-CIO: Day Laborers Group Sign Pact to Advance Worker, Immigration Rights, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 154, at A-4 (Aug. 10, 2006); see generally Janice Fine, Worker 
Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 419–
426 (2005–2006). 
 174. See Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 518 n.45 
(2006) (noting other alternative employee groups’, including the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union/UNITE!, immigrant worker centers). 
 175. Id. at 516–18; see also Fred Feinstein, Renewing and Maintaining Union Vitality: New 
Approaches to Union Growth, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 337, 351–52 (2005–2006) (describing 
several other nontraditional employee groups). 
 176. Sam Estreicher has made similar recommendations for unions to readjust their strategies 
to the modern economy, including focusing on helping firm performance, creating portable 
benefits for contingent and other less traditional workers, and pushing for fair trade and other 
international labor standards that are not too limiting on lesser developed countries.  See 
Estreicher, supra note 19, at 92–95. 
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Moreover, many domestic laws often create hurdles for nontraditional 
employee groups.  In the United States, for example, the National Labor 
Relations Act prohibits many informal entities that could provide employees 
with a voice in the workplace if they receive support from employers.177  Such 
legal impediments—which often reflect the older economies in which they 
were enacted—rather than the economy of today—need to be eliminated if 
employee groups are able to adapt fully to challenges of globalism.178 
An alternative to nontraditional private employee groups are the state-
assisted entities prevalent in much of Europe and other countries.  Works 
councils are an example of this type of employee group and are often 
characterized by their non-antagonistic relationship with employers.179  In 
Israel and many European countries, many workers—no matter whether they 
are members of more traditional unions—participate in their respective 
employers’ works councils.180  The works councils act primarily as a 
consultative body rather than a bargaining one; employers must often discuss 
certain matters with a works council, but the council does not engage in formal 
bargaining.181 
The type of industry involved and structure of these works councils shape 
their ability to help both workers and firms.  There is also some evidence that 
works councils tend to lose their ability to improve firm performance when 
they shift to a more antagonistic role.182  If true, this further supports the notion 
that effective employee action in a global economy may require, at times, a 
less confrontational and more collaborative relationship with employers.  The 
ability to establish such a relationship is often at the mercy of employers, but 
 
 177. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 18, at 1152–66 (arguing for a loosening of the 
definition of “labor organization” under section 2(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2006), 
which would narrow the “company union” provision of section 8(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) 
(prohibiting employer support or domination of a labor organization)). 
 178. See Estreicher, supra note 155, at 834–49 (advocating several legal reforms to foster 
different types of employee groups).  For a broad argument urging more innovative worker 
organizations and more legal protections for such organizations, see Mark Barenberg, Democracy 
and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible 
Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 759–60 (1994). 
 179. See generally Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an 
American Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 607 (2004). 
 180. See Thomas A. Kochan, Updating American Labor Law:  Taking Advantage of a 
Window of Opportunity, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 101, 113 (2006). 
 181. Estreicher, supra note 19, at 85–86. 
 182. See John T. Addison et al., Works Councils in Germany: Their Effects on Establishment 
Performance, 53 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 659, 661 (2001). 
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workers could be more assertive about pursuing such relationships and 
demonstrating their benefits to employers.183 
Whether through a state-protected works council or a private employee 
group that provides non-bargaining services, employee collective action must 
adapt to the current global labor market.  Employee groups must recognize not 
only the differences in various industries, but also the different needs of 
workers and employers in a more competitive global economy.184  Many 
difficulties still exist for such efforts, but they hold more hope for many 
workers than traditional, representative collective action.  Whether unions and 
other groups sufficiently fill this need remains an open question.  But we are 
likely to see more efforts develop in the future. 
D. International Treaties and Governmental Pressure 
In addition to direct employee action, another strategy to protect employee 
interests in the global economy is to use government power to implement and 
enforce workplace protections.185  Such protections generally arise as part of a 
treaty or other multinational agreement.186  These agreements can be defended 
as a means to avoid a race to the bottom in labor standards, as a means to solve 
coordination problems that prevent voluntary compliance, or on human rights 
grounds.187  Despite their promise, however, labor provisions in international 
agreements have, to this point, been a disappointment.  This is unfortunate, as 
cross-national pressure appears to be one of the few—if not only—options to 
help a large number of workers, particularly those receiving low-wages or 
work in industries that do not garner much publicity.  But to be effective, 
international agreements must provide significant remedies that countries 
actually have the will to use.  If countries begin to move in this direction—
which they have largely failed to do thus far—they could provide substantial 
gains for many workers around the world. 
 
 183. United States law is a further barrier to many of these collaborative efforts, as employers 
may violate the NLRA if they engage in bilateral discussions with a group that includes 
employees.  See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Fairbrother et al., supra note 76, at 34. 
 185. See generally Stone, supra note 14, at 998–1019 (describing four broad ways in which 
governments can regulate labor standards, including “supranational” labor standards legislation, 
multinational harmonization of labor standards, application of one country’s labor standards to 
another country in certain instances, and extraterritorial application of a country’s laws on a more 
consistent basis). 
 186. See generally Richard N. Block & Jonas Zoninsein, International Labor Standards and 
International Trade: An Economic Overview, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, supra note 17, at 666.  Moreover, the European Union has begun to implement 
requirements that all employers doing business in Europe meet certain labor standards.  See 
Estreicher, supra note 19, at 89 (describing the European Union “social charter” campaign); 
Stone, supra note 14, at 1000–01. 
 187. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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Although the specifics vary, labor agreements generally involve promises 
by the signatory countries to enforce certain labor rights and to provide a 
system to ensure compliance within their borders.188  Failure to meet these 
promises can subject a country to trade sanctions or other penalties.189  As 
described below, however, one of the major problems with using treaties to 
advance workers’ interests is that thus far, countries have been reluctant to 
push for any substantial remedial action.190  Instead, attempts to enforce labor 
standards usually produce little more than intergovernmental discussions.191  
These discussions can be helpful in upholding certain labor rights, but still fall 
short of the effects that true sanctions could produce. 
One of the original attempts to impose international labor standards—the 
ILO—illustrates some of the difficulties in making these standards effective.  
During the formation of the post-World War I League of Nations, an attempt 
was made to establish core labor standards that would apply worldwide.  From 
this attempt, the ILO was born.192  The ILO set forth several core labor 
standards, including freedom of association, freedom from discrimination, and 
the right to collective representation.193 
Although it remains an important aspirational baseline, the ILO has had a 
limited effect on actual workplace conditions.  One glaring problem is that 
many countries, including the United States, have failed to ratify many of the 
ILO standards.194  Because countries simply choose on their own whether to 
sign on to various standards, the ILO can be viewed as merely affirming the 
practices that signatory countries already follow.  Thus, there is little pressure 
for nonsignatory countries—which are often the ones that need to make the 
most improvements in their labor protections—to agree to comply with the 
ILO standards. 
An additional problem with the ILO is that it has few enforcement 
measures that can be used against noncompliant countries, even if they are 
signatories.195  Aside from some investigatory power and a scheme for 
intergovernmental discussions, the ILO is powerless to adjudicate alleged 
 
 188. Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back—Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights 
Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan, Via Chile, to Latin American, and 
Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 689, 694 (2003). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 697–98. 
 191. Id. at 698–99. 
 192. Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 192, at 48–49. 
 193. See supra note 121 and accompanying text; Edward E. Potter, The Growing Significance 
of International Labor Standards on the Global Economy, in COMPENSATION, WORK HOURS 
AND BENEFITS supra note 88, at 19, 19–29 (explaining history and role of ILO in enforcing 
global labor standards). 
 194. Id. at 48–49. 
 195. Id. 
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violations of its provisions or to impose penalties on noncompliant 
countries.196  Not surprisingly, the ILO seems to have little effect on the labor 
markets of lesser developed countries, which are often most in need of labor 
reform.197 
ILO standards, therefore, often provide no more than a means of 
publicizing countries’ purported beliefs in certain labor rights rather than 
genuine enforcement.  Although publicity is of limited value, it can still be an 
effective part of employee groups’ overall strategy.  The AFL-CIO, for 
instance, openly uses the ILO complaint system as a means of attracting 
attention to what it views as shortcomings in U.S. labor law.  In one instance, 
the union alleged that a series of National Labor Relations Board decisions had 
systematically denied workers’ rights in violation of ILO standards.198  
Although the AFL-CIO requested that the United States restore those rights, 
the union recognized that the complaint would not bring about any changes on 
its own.199  Instead, the hope was that the complaint might help to sway public 
opinion—and the opinion of other countries—against the U.S. government’s 
labor law positions.200  This use of the ILO and its standards cannot achieve 
significant improvements on its own but does represent a potentially valuable 
strategy, particularly against companies or countries like the United States, 
which often hold themselves up as a model for others to follow. 
Another application of the ILO labor standards is as a template for labor 
protections in treaties and other international agreements.  Indeed, many 
treaties explicitly incorporate ILO standards.  The ILO, therefore, often serves 
as a common baseline for core labor protections around the world.  Whether 
agreements to comply with those standards are actually met, however, is a 
different question.  As the following examples illustrate, the answer to that 
question, thus far, has been disappointing. 
 
 196. Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 192, at 48–49. 
 197. Id. at 84–86; see also George Tsogas, Labour Standards in International Trade 
Agreements: An Assessment of the Arguments, 10 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 351, 355 
(1999) (noting lack of evidence that labor standards affect trade). 
 198. Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs., Complaint to the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations Concerning the United States Government’s Violations of Freedom of Association 
and Collective Bargaining by Failing to Enforce the National Labor Relations Act, 10–41, ILO 
Case No. 2608 (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/mamr-78btn4/ 
$File/ILOcomplaint.pdf (citing alleged violations of ILO Convention 87, which protects the 
freedom of association and right to organize, and ILO Convention 98, which applies the 
principles of the right to organize and to collectively bargain) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Compliant]. 
 199. Id. at 41. 
 200. See David Moberg, Labor Strikes Back, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=labor_strikes_back. 
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The highest profile treaty with labor standards—at least from the American 
perspective—is the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)201 and its 
labor side agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC).202  The NAALC provisions, which are similar to the ILO standards 
but do not explicitly derive from them, have been invoked on several 
occasions.  One instance involved Mexican apple pickers in Washington State.  
Aided by both American and Mexican labor unions, the workers filed a 
complaint with Mexican officials that alleged improper pesticide exposure, 
failure to pay minimum wage and overtime owed to nonagricultural 
workers,203 and antiunion retaliation.204  After consultations between Mexican 
and United States officials, the United States government and apple growers 
agreed to hold meetings with migrant workers, community leaders, and local 
public officials in which the complaint’s allegations could be discussed.205  
Informing workers was no doubt a positive step, as a significant number of 
workers were likely unaware of their legal protections.206  Yet the lack of any 
concrete remedies was a serious shortcoming—one that has arisen in all 
NAALC disputes.207 
NAALC’s inability to provide meaningful remedies illustrates the 
difficulties in enforcing labor standards through the treaty process, but also 
highlights the possible benefits if countries ever became serious about labor 
rights.  NAALC’s provisions reflect the compromises needed to clear the 
numerous political hurdles to the agreement’s creation.  The United States 
 
 201. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 202. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 
I.L.M. 1499 (1993) [hereinafter NAALC]. 
 203. The Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage and overtime provisions do not apply to 
agricultural workers. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (2006). 
 204. Steven Greenhouse, Mexicans Were Denied U.S. Rights, Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
1998, at A18.  This dispute is also an illustration of the reality that labor standards agreements 
can foster cooperation among employee groups.  See Parbudyal Singh, NAFTA and Labor: A 
Canadian Perspective, 23 J. LAB. RES. 433, 441–42 (2002). 
 205. Paul D. Lall, Note, Immigrant Farmworkers and the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 597, 599–600 (1999). 
 206. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information:  A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110 (1997) 
(study showing employees’ incorrect views about their rights against discharges); Mark V. 
Roehling, The Good Cause Norm in Employment Relations: Empirical Evidence and Policy 
Implications, 14 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 91, 92–98 (2002) (describing studies); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 229–30 (2001). 
 207. Diana Chew & Richard A. Posthuma, International Employment Dispute Resolution 
Under NAFTA’s Side Agreement on Labor, 53 LAB. L.J. 38, 41–44 (2002) (reviewing all NAALC 
cases filed at time of publication); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NORTH AMERICAN 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:  U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH ENVIRONMENT, LABOR, AND INVESTOR 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CASES 31 (2001). 
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initially proposed a labor side agreement late in the negotiation process, largely 
as a way for President Clinton to lessen organized labor’s objections to 
NAFTA.  Still, unions were critical of the substance of the side agreement.208  
And Mexico and Canada were resistant to adding the labor provisions as 
well.209  They ultimately acceded, but the result was a weak agreement.210 
In particular, NAALC does not require much of the NAFTA signatory 
countries.  The agreement notes various core labor principles, yet it requires 
only that signatory countries apply their own labor laws.211  Although it is not 
always a given that a country will enforce its own laws,212 this requirement 
does little to advance labor rights.  Indeed, not only does NAALC fail to 
institute new protections for workers, or enhance previously existing rights, it 
also allows any country to backtrack on labor protections simply by changing 
its domestic law.213 
While NAALC’s substantive protections are weak, enforcement of those 
protections appears even weaker.  Theoretically, the agreement allows for a 
panel of experts to review a complaint and, in certain instances, arbitration that 
could result in financial penalties.214  But the reality is that none of the 
signatory countries have had the stomach to seriously press one another to 
remedy labor violations.  That failure is a serious problem, as it makes 
NAALC more of a public relations measure—much like certain companies’ 
unilateral codes of conduct215—than any meaningful protection for workers.216  
 
 208. See Lance Compa, International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty Question: NAFTA 
and Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 117, 133 (1993). 
 209. See Singh, supra note 204, at 439; Weiss, supra note 188, at 702–03. 
 210. Weiss, supra note 188, at 703–05. 
 211. These principles are: 
(1) freedom of association and the right to organize; 
(2) the right to bargain collectively; 
(3) the right to strike; 
(4) the prohibition of forced labor; 
(5) labor protections for children and young persons; 
(6) assurance of minimum labor standards; 
(7) elimination of employment discrimination; 
(8) equal pay for women and men; 
(9) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses; 
(10) compensation in cases of occupational illnesses and injuries; and 
(11) protection of migrant workers. 
NAALC, supra note 202, at 1515–16. 
 212. See AFL-CIO Complaint, supra note 198, at 1. 
 213. NAALC, supra note 202, at 1503. 
 214. Weiss, supra note 188, at 732 (noting that only safety and health, child labor, and 
minimum wages are entitled to dispute resolution). 
 215. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
462 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:427 
It raises the question, however, of whether genuine intergovernmental pressure 
over labor violations could be effective. 
Unfortunately, most subsequent treaties have failed to provide an answer.  
For instance, another labor agreement that delivers less than it promises is the 
recent Dominican Republic Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR).  This treaty explicitly incorporated portions of the 
ILO labor standards, requiring signatory countries to strive to protect the labor 
rights contained within the ILO’s primary conventions.217  Each country has 
the freedom to promulgate its own labor laws and enforcement schemes, but, 
in so doing, it must ensure workers have a fair and transparent means of 
seeking enforcement and appropriate remedies.218  Alleged violations of 
CAFTA-DR’s labor standards, however, merely trigger intergovernmental 
discussions and the possibility of a dispute settlement panel.219  Thus, CAFTA-
DR—like most of the half-dozen or so other American treaties that currently 
contain labor provisions—share the same serious enforcement shortcomings as 
NAALC.220 
This enforcement failure was, theoretically at least, finally breached in the 
2007 Peru Free Trade Agreement (Peru FTA).221  House Representative 
Charles Rangel described the Peru FTA as an important change from previous 
agreements like NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, which garnered little support from 
Democrats in Congress.222  According to Mr. Rangel, many Democratic 
lawmakers objected to these earlier treaties because of their failure to include 
meaning enforcement of labor rights.223  In contrast, the Peru FTA passed both 
houses of Congress by large margins—a result that occurred partly because the 
agreement stated that violations of five basic ILO rights would subject a 
signatory country to the same penalties as violations of any other section of the 
 
 216. See Singh, supra note 204, at 442–43 (noting that Canadian unions still resist NAFTA 
and its labor standards); see also Greenhouse, supra note 204, at A18 (describing advocates’ 
belief that NAFTA does not do enough for migrant workers in Washington state). 
 217. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Costa 
Rica-Dom. Rep.-El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., art. 16.1.1, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.us 
tr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/ 
final-text [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. 
 218. Id. art.16.1, 16.3. 
 219. Id. art. 16.6. 
 220. See Jennifer Alewelt, Comment, The Heat Is on in Latin America: The Future and 
Implications of the Colombian Free Trade Agreement, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 159, 171–72. 
(2008). 
 221. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, ch. 17, Apr. 12, 2006, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text 
[hereinafter Peru FTA]. 
 222. Charles B. Rangel, Moving Forward: A New, Bipartisan Trade Policy That Reflects 
American Values, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 389–91 (2008). 
 223. Id. at 390. 
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agreement.224  It is too early to tell whether any country will have the fortitude 
to push for the more extreme penalties, particularly trade sanctions,225 but the 
explicit possibility of meaningful remedies is a step in the right direction.226 
Despite the disappointment of NAALC, CAFTA-DR, and other 
international labor provisions, hope still exists for cross-national labor 
agreements.  The enforcement measures in the Peru FTA and subsequent 
agreements illustrate that such efforts227—particularly bilateral agreements and 
other efforts in which building trust between the parties is easier228—present an 
opportunity to implement meaningful protections for workers.229  If countries 
actually begin to take advantage of the enforcement options available under 
these agreements, workers around the world could see real gains. 
One only need look at countries’ reactions to perceived trade violations to 
see this potential.  Governments become apoplectic when they believe that 
other countries are violating international trade regulations, and they are quick 
to engage in significant pressure—including demands for retaliatory tariffs and 
other financial penalties—to remedy the violations.230  Most recently, for 
instance, the United States 2009 economic stimulus package created fierce 
protest from its trading partners, particularly Canada.231  Although it did not 
include any measures prohibited by treaties, the United States stimulus 
package promulgated several “buy American” provisions, requiring United 
 
 224. Id. at 389–90 (describing votes); Peru FTA, supra note 221, art. 21.2.1; see supra note 
121 and accompanying text. 
 225. Peru FTA, supra note 221, art. 21.16.2; see also Laura Ho et al., (Dis)Assembling Rights 
of Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383, 398 (1996) (arguing that trade sanctions could provide a 
“powerful disincentive” against labor violations). 
 226. Alternatively, agreements could use a “carrot” approach by implementing favorable 
tariffs as a way to give countries an incentive to meet labor standards.  Kolben, supra note 57, at 
254–55. 
 227. See Rangel, supra note 222, at 392 (noting that free trade agreement with Jordan had 
even stronger enforcement for labor protections) (citing United States-Jordan Trade Promotion 
Agreement, U.S.-Jordan, art. 17, Oct. 24, 2000, available at http://ustr.gov/assets/Trade_ 
Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_5112.pdf). 
 228. See Kolben, supra note 57, at 217; Hyde, supra note 57, at 153. 
 229. Weiss, supra note 188, at 697; see Francis Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalizing 
Labor Markets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 369, 410–11 (1998); But see Eddy Lee, Globalization 
and Labour Standards: A Review of Issues, 136 INT’L LAB. REV. 173, 183–87 (1997) (countering 
arguments against linking trade to labor standards); Keith E. Maskus, Should Core Labor 
Standards Be Imposed Through International Trade Policy 66–67 (World Bank, Working Paper 
No. 1817, 1997), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=44605 (arguing that economic 
theory suggests that trade sanctions are not effective remedies for labor violations). 
 230. See Anthony Faiola & Lori Montgomery, Trade Wars Launched with Ruses, End Runs, 
WASH. POST, May 15, 2009, at A1. 
 231. Id.; see American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 1605, 
123 Stat. 115, 303. 
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States-made materials to be used on various government-funded projects.232  
Canada, among other countries, expressed outrage at the provisions and some 
Canadian municipalities even barred United States companies from bidding on 
public contracts.233  In sharp contrast, one rarely hears high-level U.S. public 
officials say anything to other nations about egregious violations of basic labor 
standards.234 
If countries applied a fraction of the pressure they use for trade disputes to 
labor issues, workers around the world benefit greatly—particularly the 
poorest workers, who typically live in countries that are more susceptible to 
pressure from the United States and other countries that import a lot of 
goods.235  Part of the problem is political, as labor groups often oppose free 
trade agreements as a matter of policy.236  Groups representing workers, 
however, need to realize that there is no halting international trade; they must 
instead work within the confines of these agreements to pursue their 
interests.237  Indeed, one of the U.S. statutes that allowed for “fast track” 
ratification of treaties explicitly stated that it was intended, in part, to 
“strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to promote respect 
for core labor standards.”238  This statement of intent can prove to be 
significant, but only if employee groups work to ensure that its aim is met.239  
Until that happens, these international agreements will remain little more than 
a public relations tool for governments and employee groups that want to try to 
embarrass them.240 
 
 232. See Faiola & Montgomery, supra note 230, at A1. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements on Labor and 
the Environment, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 359, 386 (2004). One means to lessen the 
problem of government unwillingness to enforce labor rights would be to allow nongovernmental 
entities or individuals to seek private enforcement of an agreement’s labor standards, but the 
prospect for this enforcement alternative is doubtful.  Id. 
 235. One employee group, the International Coalition of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), has 
pushed to incorporate ILO standards as part of trade requirements under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) framework.  See Wills, supra note 125, at 68. See Arthurs, supra note 14, at 
286. 
 236. See Singh, supra note 204, at 436, 439. 
 237. See id. at 443. 
 238. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(11)(C) (2006). 
 239. See infra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 240. See Singh, supra note 204, at 441.  Moreover, most studies find that labor standards do 
not have a significant effect on countries’ labor markets, trade relationships, or overall economy.  
See Gould, supra note 125, at 728–30 (citing ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CORE LABOUR STANDARDS (2000)).  This 
lack of effect could be the result weakness of labor standards thus far, but may also indicate that 
increased enforcement could occur without causing a substantial economic detriment. 
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III.  THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The current options for employee collective action in the global economy 
have a mixed record at best.  Whether employees or employee advocates 
coordinate with foreign workers, persuade companies to adopt labor standards, 
reform the strategies and goals of their advocacy groups, or work within cross-
national agreements, the potential benefits of such actions do not always 
outweigh the costs.  Despite this mixed success, such actions can still deliver 
advantages to workers in certain instances.241  Moreover, employee groups are 
still in the early stages of learning how to engage in collective action in the 
global economy and will likely become more adept as time passes.242  
Improvements may be especially noticeable as groups expand their ability to 
pursue multiple strategies at the same time—an ability that appears to be a 
necessity for sustaining meaningful pressure on employers.243 
Yet, even when employee groups become adept at using a variety of 
collective actions, whatever successes they achieve are likely to be limited in 
the long-term.  One of the reasons for this limitation is that workers will be 
unable to sustain pressure on employers that are able to use lower-cost labor 
from different countries.244  Further, employee collective action can maintain a 
continuous presence only where there are sufficient legal protections for such 
efforts.245  Given this reality, the only way to ensure widespread, albeit far 
from complete, protection for workers in the global labor market is 
government action.  Whether through reforms of domestic law246 or substantial 
pressure on countries with low labor standards, government action—
 
 241. See infra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing the successful collusive efforts of 
employment groups with the Coalition of Immokalee Workers). 
 242. See, e.g., Coalition of Immokalee Workers, About CIW, http://www.ciw-online.org/ 
about.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (describing the Coalition of Immokalee Workers as 
forming only in the past decade). 
 243. See infra notes 256–58 and accompanying text (describing how the Coalition of 
Immokalee Workers united with groups to keep pressure on employers such as Taco Bell and 
other restaurant chains). 
 244. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Kolben, supra note 57, at 242–43 (discussing the necessity of integrative linkage, a 
complex and de-centralized legal strategy for insuring workers’ rights). 
 246. In addition to protections for domestic workers, legal changes can also provide foreign 
workers additional litigation options.  See generally Lance Compa, Pursuing International 
Labour Rights in U.S. Courts: New Uses for Old Tools, 57 INDUS. REL. 48 (2002) (discussing 
options for litigating foreign-related labor claims in U.S. courts); Arthurs, supra note 14, at 293. 
But see Mine Eder, The Constraints on Labour Internationalism: Contradictions and Prospects, 
in GLOBAL UNIONS? 167, 177–78 (Jeffrey Harrod & Robert O’Brien eds., 2002) (noting that, thus 
far, many countries have used globalization as a reason to lower labor standards, rather than raise 
them). 
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particularly in combination with employee collective action247—provides the 
best hope for achieving protections for the greatest number of workers.248 
The need for such protection is real.  If there is a basic set of minimum 
labor standards that most societies believe should exist,249 then the current 
global economy is a disappointment.  Countries are rewarded for falling below 
common thresholds of protection, as it allows them to offer lower cost labor.250  
Thus, to extend basic protections for a broad group of workers, especially 
those in low labor-cost countries, something more than global market forces 
must be employed.251  Government action appears to be the best means to 
achieve this protection, especially for workers who earn too little to attract the 
assistance of attorneys or who are not fortunate enough to benefit from the 
attention of employee advocacy groups. 
The need for government involvement is apparent, no matter the problems 
being addressed.  Whether because of market failures, coordination problems, 
or other issues,252 the unregulated labor market has been unable to ensure basic 
levels of protection for many workers.253  Employee collective action can be 
useful in confronting these problems, but it is unable to achieve widespread 
and lasting change.  In contrast, governments possess the power to establish 
systems in which certain labor standards are respected and enforced—even in 
areas where work conditions have traditionally been substandard. 
 
 247. See Kolben, supra note 57, at 242 (arguing for an “integrative linkage” of private and 
public enforcement of international labor standards). 
 248. See GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT 7, 139–40 (2007) (arguing that 
government action is a necessary aspect of effective international boycotts).  It is true, however, 
that there is no single ideal form of government action and that the gains possible from such 
action has limits.  See Stone, supra note 14, at 1019–27. 
 249. This belief, of course, is not universally accepted.  See Lee, supra note 229, at 183. 
 250. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Implications for the U.S. and Mexico: 
Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade, 102nd Cong. 
71–72 (1991) (statement of Stewart J. Hudson, Acting Director of the International Program 
Division of the National Wildlife Federation) (citing International Trade Commission study that 
found that liberal trade and investment agreements would encourage United States companies to 
move operations to Mexico).  Note that countries’ belief that lower labor costs helps 
economically is sufficient to maintain this incentive, even though there is a lack of evidence that 
low labor standards leads to more investment in a country.  See Hyde, supra note 57, at 149–50 
n.25; cf. Engel, supra note 57, at 347 (noting that state officials’ perception that strong 
environmental enforcement drives out businesses matters more than actual effect on business 
migration). 
 251. Some workers can improve their lot within a more laissez-faire system, but workers with 
that type of leverage are increasingly rare.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing 
SAG Global One Rule). 
 252. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Kolben, supra note 57, at 204–05 (noting that a coordinated system is necessary to 
guarantee basic levels of protection for workers). 
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What is striking about the current global labor market is that governments 
need not advance high-level labor protections to improve the lot of a 
significant number of workers.254  Countries could still maintain labor cost 
differences even if some basic labor standards existed, yet those standards 
would drastically improve working conditions across much of the world.255  In 
short, serious attempts by countries to enforce a set of core labor rights would 
allow low-wage countries to continue to take advantage of their comparative 
advantage in the global labor market, while ensuring that this advantage 
creates less of a hardship for workers. 
Moreover, governments need not take the lead role in improving 
conditions for workers.  Especially where governments have already 
established reasonably strong domestic protections for labor rights and 
employee collective action, relatively modest state assistance could strengthen 
employees’ efforts to improve working conditions. 
For instance, one of the American labor movement’s bright spots during 
the last decade has been the work of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers 
(CIW).  The CIW, centered in Immokalee, Florida, started as an effort to aid 
migrant Hispanic agricultural workers state wide.256  Its greatest success has 
been the use of boycotts and other publicity—along with several other 
advocacy groups—to force Taco Bell and, later, other major restaurant chains 
and grocery stores to require their tomato suppliers to pay agricultural workers 
higher wages.257  This pressure would likely not have been possible in 
countries that do not protect workers from severe harassment or violence in 
retaliation for such activities.258 
The CIW’s efforts were extraordinary, as it was a new group led by 
migrant workers inexperienced in collective action.259  The CIW, however, had 
help from organizations that included Florida Rural, a government-funded 
 
 254. See Estreicher, supra note 19, at 90–91 (discussing the utility of comparative advantage). 
 255. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The 
Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2007) (arguing that employers need 
not always lower labor standards to compete in the global economy and that such an argument 
ignores negative costs of low-standard policies). 
 256. Coalition of Immokalee Workers, About CIW, http://www.ciw-online.org/about.html 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 257. The companies include McDonald’s, Burger King, Subway, and Whole Foods.  Id. 
 258. See supra notes 135–143 and accompanying text (noting allegations of Chiquita’s 
involvement with harassment against labor leaders in Central America).  One irony about the 
CIW’s efforts is that the boycott against Taco Bell and other restaurants—a boycott aimed at 
getting growers, not the restaurants, to pay more—would be unlawful secondary pressure under 
the NLRA, save for the act’s exclusion of agricultural workers.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) 
(excluding agricultural workers from NLRA’s definition of “employee”); Id. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) 
(making most types of secondary pressure unlawful). 
 259. See About CIW, supra note 242 (describing the CIW as only forming in 1993). 
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legal services corporate entity.260  The CIW workers spearheaded most of the 
direct collective activity, but, at least in the employee group’s earlier days, 
Florida Rural helped the CIW incorporate as a tax-exempt organization, and it 
continues to assist with the group’s corporate law issues, among others.261  
This partnership made advances that the private employee group likely would 
not have achieved on its own.262 
The CIW has also recognized the power of more direct government action, 
particularly law enforcement.  As part of its campaign to end involuntary 
servitude practices in the Florida agricultural industry, the CIW was able to 
pressure the federal Department of Justice to criminally prosecute some 
growers.263  The CIW’s experiences illustrate the possible benefits of strong 
employee collective action, especially in conjunction with other advocacy 
groups, while also reinforcing the importance of government support and 
protection for such efforts.264 
It is unlikely, if not impossible, that employee collective action will fully 
reverse the costs that globalism has inflicted on workers.  But if workers and 
governments do a better job of recognizing the new challenges that workers 
face in the current economy and adopt flexible, multifaceted strategies to 
address those challenges, the costs of globalism may be reduced.  Government 
action is a particularly important factor, as genuine, widespread improvements 
in the workplace will exist only with adequate protection for employee 
collective action and with government pressure against countries with the 
weakest labor standards. 
CONCLUSION 
Globalism has produced numerous challenges to many of today’s workers.  
By dramatically expanding labor market competitiveness, globalism has driven 
down compensation, while making attempts to achieve better conditions less 
effective.  Despite these challenges, however, opportunities remain for 
successful collective action. 
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Considerations Organizing Structures and Strategies, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 
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act.  Id. at 421. 
 264. See supra note 242 and accompanying text; Fran Ansley, Inclusive Boundaries and 
Other (Im)possible Paths Toward Community Development in a Global World, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 353, 371–72, 376 (2001) (noting some successes in getting governments to provide some 
protection against, or during, plant closings, while also emphasizing the difficulty of such 
attempts). 
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No one strategy is a panacea, as the global economy is too complex to 
navigate with only one mode of activity.  Rather, employee groups must learn 
to use multiple strategies targeted to the needs of a given situation.  In some 
instances, coordination with other advocacy groups or unions may be the best 
course, while in others working with an employer to implement internal labor 
standards may be more effective.  Similarly, employee groups themselves must 
change and adapt to the new economic environment, paying special attention 
to the needs of workers as they attempt to secure their place in an international 
labor market.  Usually, some combination of all of these strategies will 
produce the best result.  Yet, despite the best effort of employee groups, the 
competitive pressures of globalism may still make many instances of collective 
action ineffectual. 
This reality highlights the need for more government involvement in 
securing basic labor standards.  Employee groups can only achieve so much 
and that ability is frequently cabined by the lack of legal protections for 
workers and their efforts to seek changes.  In addition to providing legal 
protection for collective action, governments should also pressure each other to 
ensure some basic level of labor protections for all workers around the world.  
Attempts at intergovernmental pressure have been weak thus far, but this type 
of pressure may provide the best hope for providing real gains for a large 
number of workers—particularly the workers in most need of protection.  
Strong government action would not ensure success; however, the lack of such 
action may well guarantee that many workers will continue to face far worse 
conditions than existed before the rise of globalism. 
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